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SUSTAINABILITY, DISTRIBUTION, AND
THE MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
DOUGLAS H. KYSAR*
Abstract: Legal economic analysis has traditionally focused on the
application of microeconomic theory to questions of legal import.
Scholars have generally regarded macroeconomic effects of legal rules
as lying beyond the purview of the legal decisiomnaker's jurisdiction.
This Article argues that such exclusion of macroeconomic subject
matter from legal analysis may rest on a scientifically erroneous view of -
the economic process. The conventional understanding of the
economic process presumes an unlimited supply of material inputs and
an infinite natural capacity to absorb waste outputs. Fundamental
scientific principles suggest that this understanding is flawed. The
economic process must necessarily be limited in scale by the capacity of
the ecological superstructure to sustain it. Thus, in addition td the
efficient allocation of resources, legal economic analysis also should be
concerned with the sustainable maintenance of scale. Consideration of
scale effects by legal decisionmakers cannot be safely ignored in the way
that distributive effects have been, given that no political mechanism
analogous to the tax and transfer system exists to regulate the scale of
the macroeconomy.
INTRODUCTION
"[T]he true rationalism must always transcend itself by recurrence
to the concrete in search of inspiration. A self-satisfied rationalism
is in effect a form of anti-rationalism. It means an arbitrary halt at
a particular set of abstractions." 1
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University. BA, 1995, Indiana University. ID.,
1998, Harvard University. For helpful continents on earlier drafts, I thank Robert Bone,
Ronald Cass, Herman Daly, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Michael Harper, slot' Hanson, Lisa
Heinzerling, Keith Hylton, James Salzman., Theodore Sims, and attendees at the Environ-
mental Law Workshop at the Georgetown, University Law Center and the Feminism, Cor-
porations, and Capitalism Workshop at the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy of
SUNY-Buffalo. l especially thank Jeffrey Rachlinski and Stewart Schwab for their generosity
in providing extensive comments and discussing at length the issues addressed herein. All
misjudgments, errors, and omissions arc my own.
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In January of 1999, geologist Peter Barrett from Victoria Univer-
sity in Wellington, New Zealand, made a startling announcement at a
gathering of international climate experts considering the effects of
greenhouse emissions on global warming. 2 According to Barrett, the
West Antarctic ice-sheet, which is approximately the size of Mexico
and is currently grounded below sea level, was showing signs of be-
coming unstable and potentially breaking away. 3 Scientists have sus-
pected since at least the mid-1990s that Antarctic ice-shelves, which
float on the ocean surface and are attached to the grounded ice-
sheets, are retreating at rapid rates.4 In early 1999, researchers at the
University of Colorado at Boulder's National Snow and Ice Data Cen-
ter and the British Antarctic Survey confirmed this hypothesis by us-
ing satellite photos to identify a loss of nearly 3000 square kilometers
from protective ice shelves around the Antarctic Peninsula in the last
year alone.5 Compared to the total loss of only 7000 square kilometers
in the previous fifty years, these latest fractures suggested that the 4.5
degree increase in mean temperature in Antarctica since the 1940s
has had an escalating effect on glacial instability. 6
What Barrett found more troubling, however, is the relationship
between the "full retreat" 7 of the ice-shelves and the crumbling of the
West Antarctic ice-sheet. Melting ice-shelves have little net effect on
sea levels because the shelves float on the ocean surface, displacing
approximately the amount of water they contain. 8 Ice-sheets, on the
other hand, threaten to substantially increase global sea levels if they
melt—a prospect rendered more likely by the steady disappearance of
surrounding ice-shelves. 9 Scientists estimate that complete melting of
the West Antarctic ice-sheet could result in a six-meter rise in sea lev-
els. 10
 A rise of just one meter would affect 3% of the total land area of
the planet, including such major cities as New York, London, and
Bangkok, and as much as 30%. of the world's cropland."
2 See Grover Foley, The Threat of Rising Seas, 29 EcoLocasT 76, 76 (1999).
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 See Jim Kirksey, Warming Puts Antarctic Ice Shelves in Full Reheat, DENVER POST, Apr. 10,
1999, at A27.
C Seeid.
' Id.
A See Foley, supra note 2, at 77
9
 See id.
'° See
" See id.
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Of course, there is much uncertainty over this prognosis and, in-
deed, some debate over whether the observed phenomena are
significantly correlated with greenhouse emissions. Nevertheless, the
hypothetical disintegration of the West Antarctic ice-sheet reveals
many ways in which current global market mechanisms struggle to
respond to ecological crises. Assuming that the next century will see
the unhinging of the West Antarctic ice-sheet amidst unprecedented
climate change, how would the market react? Because no private en-
tity "owns" Antarctica, no property rights-holder has a financial incen-
tive to prevent its steady disappearance. Nor would privatization of
Antarctica alleviate this dilemma given that the instrumental value of
the frozen land mass (climate stabilization) accrues to all of humanity,
not simply its "owner." 12 Or, put another way, because the two billion
people who live within one hundred kilometers of a vulnerable coast-
line" face nearly insurmountable problems of coordination and im-
perfect information, collective market action to reverse global warm-
ing trends is unlikely. Indeed, because the people likely to face the
most severe consequences of greenhouse emissions have yet to be
born, few market actors currently exist to object out of that most
powerful economic force: self-interest.
Political action is also hindered by the current market ethos. Be-
cause present beneficiaries of the market's failure to internalize the
costs of global warming will invest their rents in opposition to any ef-
forts to force internalization, proponents of such market-corrective
changes face a daunting political battle. Also, because attempts to
price the environmental costs of global atmospheric change are sci-
entifically complex and ethically controversial, market-corrective poli-
cies, even when enacted, are imperfect economic instruments. Finally,
given that the global warming problem raises issues of international
distributive equity that cannot be resolved by an increase in global
economic activity (which, at least under current industrial practices,
would exacerbate the global warming problem), developed nations
accustomed to economic growth as a response to all questions of eq-
12 "Free market environmentalists" advocate the creation and clarification of property
rights as a means of overcoming a variety of environmental problems. See, e.g., Terry L.
AIIIICrS011 & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmentalism: Hindsight and Foursight, 8 Cox-
NELL J.L. & Pun. Pot.'v 111,112 (1998). However, they do not typically advocate such solu-
tions with respect to environmental goods and services that cannot he narrowly defined or
easily withheld from free-riders. See id. at 128-30.
t3
	
Platt McGinn, Charting a New Cowie for Oceans, in STATE OF TIM WoRtn 78, 78
(Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1999).
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uity must undergo nothing short of a political and cultural transfor-
mation—a prospect rendered dim by the continued refusal of the
United States to adopt the Kyoto Protocol."
For these and other reasons, conventional economic policy
struggles to respond to ecological crises such as the problem of global
warming. This Article attempts to locate the cause of that struggle in
the conceptual underpinnings of macroeconomic theory. Put simply,
standard macroeconomics utilizes assumptions about the relationship
between human and ecological activity that may well lack a sound sci-
entific basis. Moreover, once alternative assumptions are put into
place, the course of macroeconomic theory shifts in ways that carry
dramatic implications for legal economic analysis. Most notably, the
revised theory raises questions about the justification generally given
for excluding macroeconomic subject matter from the study of law
and economics.
Since its inception, law and economics has attracted criticism
from scholars who find its assumptions unrealistic. 15 For a long time,
this response was purely critical in form, exposing as flawed the be-
havioral assumptions of law and economics without proposing corre-
sponding changes to increase its veracity. In recent years, however, a
group of scholars has devoted considerable insight and energy to the
project of behavioral law and economics. 16 This emerging subdisci-
" The Kyoto Protdcol is an agreement reached by member nations of the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change to reduce global emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases. See Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) to the
United Nations Framework Convention 011 Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
AlthOugh President Clinton signed the treaty in 1997, the United States Senate failed to
ratify it and the Bush Administration later refuted U.S. agreement with the treaty's princi-
ples.
15 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 769 (1979); Mark Kel-
man, Consumption Thew); Production Theory, and Ideology in the Goose Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 V. L. REV. 451 (1974); Richard H. Hides & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging
Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Polities, 90 Comm. L.
REv. 2121 (1990); Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 ..11. & ECON. 427
(1972).
l'' See, e.g„ Jon 1). Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633-35 (1999) (describing efforts to incor-
porate cognitive psychological and other evidence of human behavior into law and eco-
nomics); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economies, 50 SUN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1051 (2000); Jeffrey J. Racldinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics,
Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CottNELL L. Rex. 739 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Behav-
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pline fuses traditional neoclassical economic analysis with lessons
drawn from cognitive psychology and decision theory research. The
result is a law and economics grounded in assumptions that comport
better with observed real-world behavior than the stylized rational ac-
tor model featured in conventional law and economics. The fruits of
this effort are now dominating new research in law journals, such that
it is no overstatement to conclude, "The future of economic analysis
of law lies in new and better understandings of decision and choice.'"
With a few notable exceptions," this project to improve the ve-
racity of law and economics assumptions has focused exclusively on
the foundational principles of microeconomics.° A group of dedicated
scholars within economics, biology, and ecology departments have
undertaken a parallel project to reform the assumptions of macroeco-
nomics. These scholars—who have banded together under the moni-
ker, ecological economists—adopt the saute methodology as legal behav-
ioral economists. They examine the most robust findings from
disciplines outside of economics and utilize those findings to steer
economic analysis toward what they believe is greater real-world rele-
vance. As behavioralists instill microeconomic analysis with the teach-
ings of cognitive psychology and decision theory, ecological econo-
mists bring the findings of ecology, biology, and environmental
science to macroeconomics,
ioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Cnt. L. REV. 1175 (1997) !hereinafter, Sunsicin, Behavioral
Analysis).
17 Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 16, at 1175.
19 See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administra-
tive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 563-77 (1997) (assessing the merils of cost-
benefit assessment of regulatory options in light of macroeconomic considerations such as
long-term economic stability, employment maximization, and sustainability); Jeff L. Lewin,
Toward a New Ecological LnwEconomics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PER-
spr.crivEs 249 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Brain' eds., 1995) (arguing for the
incorporation of ecological economic concepts into legal analysis).
19 This narrowness of fools comes with good reason: law and economies itself has been
restricted largely to applications of microeconomic theory. As Mark Kaman has noted,
"When legal scholars and law students discuss the impact of economics on their under-
standing of law, they invariably think about microeconomics, not macroeconomics." Mark
Could Lanyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1215, 1216 (1993) (emphasis omitted). Thomas Ulen, a leading law and economics
scholar, has likewise noted that [t]he novel aspect of law and economics scholarship is its
use of microeconomir theory to examine the consequences of legal rules and institutions in
the core areas of the common law—property, contracts, torts, civil procedure, cr' al law
and procedure, and constitutional law." Thomas S. Ulen, '11w Lessons of Law and Economics,
21 LEGAL ECON. 103, 105 (1992) (emphasis added).
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This Article introduces the field of ecological economics and ana-
lyzes its potential use as a macroeconomics" for legal analysis. Rather
than engage in a full critical evaluation of the foundational assump-
tions of ecological economics, 21 this Article largely accepts them as
true and asks the speculative question, "What would that mean for
legal analysis?" As will be seen, the implications could be quite broad.
Traditionally, legal economists have given little attention to macro-
economic subject matter.22 If the tenets of ecological economics are to
be believed, this narrowness of focus may rest on unfounded assump-
tions about the nature of human economic activity and its relation-
ship to the environment. Indeed, if the ecological economic under-
standing of this relationship is correct, the impact of legal rules on
the macroeconomy could become an issue of central theoretical con-
cern to legal scholars.
Ecological economics offers this potential because it is built
around a more complex understanding of human economic goals
than traditional economic analysis. Economists recognize two primary
functions served by the market: the allocation of resources among
competing uses (allocation) and the distribution of wealth among
market participants (distribution). In grossly simplified terms,
economists believe that the first function suggests market policies de-
signed to maximize allocative efficiency, while the second function
requires a social decision best left to the political process. Ecological
economists argue that a third function served by the market has been
overlooked by conventional analysis: moderation of the scale of hu-
man economic activity vis-a-vis the ecological superstructure upon
which all life and activity depends (scale). While allocation deter-
mines the purposes for which resources are used, scale determines
the rate and amounts of resources that are used.
20 As will be seen, ecological economists do not devote significant attention to many of
the "standard" macroeconomic subjects that readers may expect to encounter (i.e..
inflation, business cycles, deficit spending, and monetary policy). Rather, they focus upon
the more basic concerns of economic growth and total output, believing that fundamental
conceptual errors have been made at that level, before one even addresses the more
specific, technical macroeconomic subjects.
21 For reasons explained infra text accompanying notes 256-287, the necessity of
adopting an ecological economic workiview depends on highly empirical questions about
the ability of human technology to circumvent naturally imposed constraints on economic
expansion, questions t hat will only be answered by the annals of history. This Article there-
fore does not ask the presently unanswerable question, "Are the ecological economists
right?" Instead, it asks the inure fruitful question, "What if they arc right?"
22
 See supra note 19.
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Like their orthodox counterparts, ecological economists offer a
norm to accompany this concept. Just as economists almost instinc-
tively believe that allocative efficiency should be maximized, ecologi-
cal economists tend to believe that the scale of the economy should
be sustainable, that is, capable of reproduction in perpetuity (or its
practical equivalent). Readers who are uncomfortable with some of
the more dramatic implications of sustainability should bear in mind
that the fundamental insight of ecological economics is a recognition
of the concept of scale, not necessarily the norm of sustainability.
Whether or not one accepts all of the implications of sustainability as
a norm, ecological economists seek acknowledgment that human
economic activity impacts the environment and that the size and rate
of that impact is a legitimate subject of social and legal influence.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief history of ecological eco-
nomics, tracing its development from a few foundational articles in
the late 1960s and early 1970s to a lively transdisciplinary subject that
forms the intellectual core of today's major international efforts to
achieve sustainable development." The fundamental principles of
ecological economics are examined to provide the reader with a
primer on this discipline which has been described as the science
and management of sustainability."24 Representative applications of
ecological economic concepts are reviewed, demonstrating the poten-
tial ability of such concepts to influence economic activity to become
more consonant with the ecological needs of the earth.
Part II addresses several criticisms that have been raised against
ecological economics and argues that most miss their mark." Often,
critics of ecological economics raise attacks that reflect a misunder-
standing of its basic concepts. As Part II demonstrates, once these
criticisms are taken to their logical conclusions, they turn out to
strengthen, rather than undermine the emerging discipline. Never-
theless, one particular criticism—relating to the possibility of market
forces to inspire the discovery or creation of substitutes for scarce
natural resources—remains a powerful challenge to ecological eco-
nomics. Economists often view price as a built-in market mechanism
for conservation: as resources grow scarce, they rise in price and in-
spire the development of substitute materials. Such dynamics, on the
23 See infra notes 27-207 and accompanying text.
" See ECOLOGICAL. ECONOMICS: TIIE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY
(Robert Costanza ed., 1991).
25 See infra notes 208-295 and accompanying text.
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economist's account, obviate the need for direct legal control of mar-
ket exploitation of natural resources.
Ecological economists oppose this view by arguing, among other
things, that widespread externalization of environmental costs un-
dermines the reliability of the price mechanism as a regulator of re-
source-taxing activity. Moreover, they contend that even a perfectly
functioning price system would fail to control the scale of the econ-
omy adequately. Many of the most important consequences of scale
expansion are properly conceived of as price-determining, not price-
determined. Decisionmaking about how massive the scale of the
economy ought to grow in relation to the environment, therefore,
should not occur exclusively through decentralized market microde-
cisions, no matter how well the price mechanism is functioning.
Part III speculates on the broader implications of ecological eco-
nomics for legal analysis, assuming that ecological economists are cor-
rect in their view of the relationship between human and natural capi-
ta1. 26 This Part argues that incorporation of ecological economic
insights into legal analysis is desirable both to enhance the use of
macroeconomics within legal theory, and to ensure that scholars con-
front the problem of sustainability when making legal policy recom-
mendations.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
The discipline of ecological economics is intimately concerned
with the dynamic processes that drive environmental change, espe-
cially those processes that involve the intersection of human and eco-
system activity. Moreover, the discipline is also focused, like traditional
economics, on market transactions. As such, the discipline is particu-
larly well suited to guide economic and legal policymaking under
conditions of increasing ecological strain. To better understand the
potential advantages of ecological economics as an analytical frame-
work, this Part begins with a brief review of its history, followed by a
printer on fundamental ecological economic concepts.
A. A Brief History
Although many ecological economic themes resonate with cen-
tury old thoughts of the classic economist John Stuart Mill, 27
 the dis-
26 See infra notes 296-318 and accompanying text.
27
 Indeed, Mill's prescient thoughts are worth quoting at the outset:
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cipline's modern origins can be traced to three landmark articles
from the late 1960s and early 1970s.
1. "The Economics of the Coining Spaceship Earth"
The first of the three landmark articles came in 1966 from past
president of the American Economic Association, Kenneth Boulding.
Entitled The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, Boulding's essay
was a metaphorical masterpiece. 28 His thesis was simple: while main-
stream economists view the economy as an open system of pure. ex-
change value with externalized environmental consequences, the
steady progression of humanity toward the carrying capacity of the
earth will require that economic activity be reconceived as a closed
system within which enviroimiental consequences must be consid-
ered, Of course, economists since Arthur Pigou have recognized the
existence of "externalities" such as the cost of pollution from indus-
trial activity." Yet Boulding's essay revealed something deeper than
Pigou's mere microeconomic failure of private cost functions to
reflect full social costs. The vivid and enduring language that Bould-
ing used to explore the contrast between open and closed visions of
the economic system revealed a macroeconomic problem—an eco-
nomic culture predisposed to the creation of Pigouvian externalities
on a massive, public scale.
Boulding summarized the mainstream economic perspective as
the "cowboy economy," in which natural frontiers are seen as limitless,
resources as inexhaustible, and Wastes as innocuous." Such a perspec-
tive fosters the "reckless, exploitative, romantic, and violent behavior"
If the earth nmst lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to
things that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would extirpate
from it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a bet-
ter or a happier population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that
they will he content to be stationary, long before necessity compels them 10 it.
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 750-51 (Augustus M. Kelley ed.,
1987). The current debate between mainstream and ecological economists can be under-
stood as a debate over whether Mill's stationary state has become, as he predicted, neces-
sary, rather than merely desirable.
28 Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, reprinted in VALut
THE EARTIE ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 297 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend
eds., 1993).
SeeA.C. Picots, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 149-79 (1920) (introducing and dis-
cussing the concept of market externalities).
34 Boulding, supra note 28, at 303.
10	 B6lon College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:1
to be expected of a cowboy." Relative to the economist's task, "[i]f
there are infinite reservoirs from which material can be obtained and
into which effluvia can be deposited, then the throughput [that is, the
sheer volume of production and consumption in an economy] is at
least a plausible measure of the success of the economy."32
 In other
words, if there are no environmental or social repercussions to eco-
nomic growth, then an increase in the gross national product (GNP)
would seem to represent an uncontroversial macroeconomic goal.
Indeed, Boulding argued that the preanalytic view of the economy as
an open system unconstrained by environmental factors leads to an
economics fixated with growth."
In contrast to this "cowboy economy," Boulding championed a
view of the "'spaceman economy," in which the earth is a closed sys-
tem necessitating consideration and careful planning of the conse-
quences of human economic activity." In a spaceship, one cannot ig-
nore the byproducts of production and consumption. 35 Likewise on
the "Spaceship Earth," humans must be concerned with the capacity
of the global vehicle to support their needs and accommodate their .
wastes. 36 Therefore, "in the spaceman economy, throughput is by no
means a desideratum, and is indeed to be regarded as something to
be minimized rather than maximized?" 37 Humans must be concerned
with the quality of economic activity that occurs, particularly as it re-
lates to the creation of enduring, efficient, and useful capital stocks.
Like Mill," Boulding saw the shift of emphasis from the quantitative
31 Id.
Id.
33
 See id. at 303-09.
51 Id. at 303.
35 Crew members aboard the Mir space station experienced a real-life example of
Bouldiug's metaphorical warning: "Somewhere up there in the starry void, two Russian
cosmonauts and an American astronaut have been facing a problem Moscow's mission
control has been unable to solve: Their toilet tanks are overflowing." Uli Schmetzer, Even
Orbiting Cosmonauts Occasionally Need a Plumber; Mir Toilet Tanks Full and No Helper at Hand,
WASH, POST, Nov. 12, 1096, at Al2.
Boulding, supra note 28, at 297.
37 Id. at 304.
58 Mill wrote:
[A] stationary condition of capital and population implies no stationary state
of human improvement. There would be as much scope as ever for all kinds
of mental culture, and moral and social progress; as much room for improv-
ing the Art of Living. and more likelihood of its being unproved, when minds
ceased to be engrossed by the art of getting on. Even the industrial arts might
be as earnestly and as successfidly cultivated, with this sole difference, that in-
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magnitude of income flows to the quality of capital stock as not just an
environmental necessity, but an improvement in social welfare: "The
essential measure of the success of the economy is not production and
consumption at all, but the nature, extent, quality, and complexity of
the total capital stock, including in this the state of the human bodies
and minds included in the system."39
Boulding concluded his essay by puzzling over why his views
placed him hi such a narrow minority of contemporary thinkers.
There is, he suspected, a widely shared feeling that "the spaceman
economy is still a good way off (at least beyond the lifetimes of any
now living), so let us eat, drink, spend, extract and pollute, and be as
merry as we can, and let posterity worry about the spaceship earth." 40
What troubled Boulding most about this perspective, besides its ethi-
cal myopia, was that he believed "[t]he shadow of the future spaceship
. . . is already falling over our spendthrift merriment."" Over three
decades later, the shadow would seem to have darkened and spread,
yet mainstream economics is no more receptive to his ideas. As Bould-
ing wryly noted in a reflection on his earlier article, "It seems to be
very hard to organize a long-run crisis."42
2. "The Tragedy of the Commons"
While Boulding's visionary essay contained the intellectual seeds
from which ecological economics would spring, biologist Garrett
Hardin's famous 1968 article, The Tragedy of the Commons, might be
considered the cultural beginning of ecological economics.° Though
its themes were well-explored over a decade earlier by an economist,"
Hardin's eloquent article had a far-ranging impact precisely because
his approach was not restricted to an economic inquiry. The fusion of
Hardin's biological insights with his elementary economic analysis
, produced a work of near-universal resonance. It is this brand of trans-
stead of serving no purpose but the increase of wealth, industrial improve-
ments would produce their legitimate effect, that of abridging labour.
MILL, supra note 27, at 751.
w Boulding, supra note 28, at 304.
Id. at 305.
41 Id. at 307.
42 Kenneth E. Boulding, Spaceship Earth Revisited, in VALUING TM EAaTI I: ECONOMICS,
ECOLOGY, ETIUGS 311, 311 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 1993).
4S Garrett Hardin, The nagrdy of the Commons, 102 Scu. 1243 (1908).
44 See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Pmperly Resources: The Fishery,
62 J. Pot.. EcoN, 124 (1954).
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disciplinary thinking that has uniquely characterized ecological eco-
nomics in the decades following The Tragedy of the Commons.
Hardin's piece focused on the well-known problem posed by al-
lowing open access to public resources.45 He described this problem
by evoking simple agrarian imagery, much like that other 1960s eco-
nomics masterpiece, The Problem of Social Cose 6
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a
pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman
will try to keep as litany cattle as possible on the commons
.... [Because the pC•sitive effects of an additional animal ac-
crue to the individual while the negative effects are spread
across all commons users], the rational herdsman concludes
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add an-
other animal to the herd. And another; and another ..
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational
herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his
herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to al1. 47
This tragedy was, of course, long known to economists under
such names as the problem of "common pool resources."48 For many
economists, however, the problem was a mere curiosity, a quirky be-
18
 There has been some confusion over terminology. As David Pearce has noted, the
term "commons" traditionally referred to commonly owned property that had certain
social norms constraining its use. Thus, the "tragedy of the commons" did not, strictly
speaking, happen to the commons. Rather the problem occurs with respect to "open-
access" property, in which no constraints, legal or social, prevent overutilization of the
resource. See R. KERRY TURNER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: AN ELEMENTARY IN-
TRODUCTION 210 (1993). The elegance of Hardin's phrasing, however, weighs in favor of
its use, despite the ambiguity.
48
 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). In the cate-
gory of articles with agrarian imagery, one might also mention the instant classic by Robert
Ellickson. His exploration of the use of norms among neighbors to resolve disputes pro-
vides a vivid illustration of how the "commons" might be regulated by social, rather than
legal, restraints. See ROBERT C. EI.LICKSON, ORDER Vt-rirritou -r 1..Aw: How NEIGHBORS SET-
TLE Disr•trrEs (1991).
47 Hardin, supra note 43, at 1244.
'18
 See Garrett Hrdin, Second Thoughts on "The Tragedy of the Commons," in VALUING THE
EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETincs 146, 146 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend
eds., 1993).
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havioral exception to the general rule of allocative market efficiency. 49
For Hardin, on the other hand, the tragedy of the commons was per-
vasive, explaining a wealth of urgent contemporary problems, from
the extinction of marine life 50 to the pollution of air and water51 to
the rapid growth of human population. 52
To circumvent the tragedy, Hardin recommended drastic legisla-
tive action, which he evocatively called "mutual coercion, mutually
agreed upon by the majority of the people affected." 55 Like Mill and
Boulding,54 Hardin viewed his recommendation as offering an
affirmative improvement in social welfare in addition to its environ-
mental benefits: "Individuals locked into a logic of the commons are
free only to bring on universal runt; once they see the necessity of
mutual coercion, they become free to pursue other goals." 55
As a foundational article in the development of ecological eco-
nomics, The Tragedy of the Commons served to remind economists that
their discipline did not exist ill a vacuum. The article's implicit mes-
sage, as Hardin would later reflect, was that economists could only
continue their self-imposed disciplinary isolation at the cost of eco-
logical health and, perhaps, human survival: "Before significant po-
litical change can be instituted, there must be a fundamental im-
provement in the theory and practice of economics, which needs to
be firmly tied down to the sort of conservation laws that have proven
essential to the progress of the natural sciences."56 Ecological eco-
nomics can be seen as the collaborative effort of a wide range of
thinkers to respond to Hardin's challenge.
3. "The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem"
The third ecological economics pillar came in the form of a lec-
ture by Vanderbilt economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen entitled The
See David R. Hodas, The Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA Reconsid-
ered, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 25-26 (1998) ("Current law mirrors the view of most
economists that environmental externalities are an inconvenient theoretical contaminant
in an otherwise elegant market system. Externalities arc only all afterthought in a legal
system driven by an individual/market oriented paradigm:).
" See Hardin, supra note 43, at 1245,
51 See id.
52 See id. at 1246.
55 ld. at 1247.
51 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
55 Hardin, supra note 43, at 1248.
m Hardin, supra note 48, at 149.
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Entropy Law and the Economic Problem.57 The lecture's themes were ex-
plored first in an earlier work which caused famed economist Paul
Samuelson to note, "I defy any informed economist to remain com-
placent after meditating over this essay."58 What Georgescu-Roegen
attempted to accomplish was nothing short of a scientific refutation of
macroeconomic theory. Invoking the laws of thermodynamics, Geor-
gescu-Roegen argued that "matter-energy [necessarily] enters the
economic process in a state of low entropy and comes out of it in a state
of high entropy," where entropy refers to the degree of chaos or disor-
der present in an energy source. 59 Fossil fuels represent the product
of millions of years of condensed solar energy—as such, they are po-
tent sources of available energy (a low-entropy energy source). Once
burned, the fossil fuels become a mixture of gases that dissipate into
the atmosphere and become largely worthless, even harmful, to hu-
mans (a high-entropy energy source).
For Georgescu-Roegen, the important point was this: the second
law of thermodynamics states that matter-energy irrevocably moves
front a condition of low- to high-entropy, front ordered, available en-
ergy to chaotic, unavailable energy. 69 In other words, "the cost of any
biological or economic enterprise is always greater than the prod-
uct."61 Thus, although animals do grow in size and species do evolve
in complexity, in actuality their physical growth and adaptation exacts
a higher cost in terms of pure matter-energy than their new forms
represent. More generally, any time that a material subsystem appears
to have violated the second law of thermodynamics, one need only
look outside the subsystem to find a source of low-entropy that is be-
ing driven to chaos. In short, Georgescu-Roegen demonstrated that
the common-sense view of resources as limited, expressed earlier by
Boulding, has theoretical support in physics: resources are limited
because their use necessarily entails their dissipation.
Given this biophysical truth fie Georgescu-Roegen set out to turn
standard macroeconomics on its head. Rather than an isolated ex-
57
 Nicholas GeorgesCu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem, reprinted in
VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETIncs 75 (Herman E., Daly & Kenneth N.
Towitsend eds., 1993).
56 HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS Or SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT 192 (1996).
" SeeCeorgescu-Roegen, supra note 57, at 77.
°See id. at 78, 80.
61 Id. at 80.
" Sonic have questioned whether the second taw of thermodynamics represents a
"truth." This objection is addressed infra text accompanying notes 217-222.
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change loop capable of perpetual expansion, the economic process is
fixed to a base of materials that is subject to identifiable constraints.
"It is because of these constraints that the economic process has a
unidirectional irrevocable evolution."63 All economic activity must
necessarily involve a step, however small, toward the exhaustion of
available energy. Georgescu-Roegen's conception of entropy laws and
economic activity is unforgiving. Nuclear power, materials recycling,
and any other technological "solution" to matter-energy scarcity is a
delusion: "There is no free recycling just as there is no wasteless en-
ergy."64 Even if humans were to give up their dependence on pollu-
tion-producing fossil fuels in favor of renewable energy sources, they
could not escape the laws of entropy. Solar energy, too, tends to chaos
in the long-run. 65
Georgescu-Roegen's conclusion is powerful, if daunting:
The upshot is clear. Every time we produce a Cadillac, we ir-
revocably destroy an amount of low entropy that could oth-
erwise be used for producing a plow or a spade. Iii other
words, every time we produce a Cadillac, we do it at the cost
of decreasing the number of human lives hi the future. Eco-
nomic development through industrial abundance may be a
blessing for us now and for those who will be able to enjoy it
in the near future, but it is definitely against the interest of
the human species as a whole, if its interest is to have a
lifespan as long as it is compatible with its dowry of low en-
tropy.66
In order to preserve the species as long as possible, Georgescu-
Roegen believed that humans must adopt an ethic of prudent man-
agement of fixed terrestrial resources. He would later advocate the
use of solar energy sources, stabilization of population sizes, reduction
65 Georgescu-Roegen, supra note 57, at 81.
64
 Id. at 83.
65 Of course, this long-run" is estimated to be some five-billion years long, see id. at 83,
and appears all the more likely to include a developed human civilization within its
benefice given advances in solar technology made since the dine of Georgescu-Roegen's
lecture. Nevertheless, the massive tinie frame involved with the sun's dissipation does not
change the fact that solar activity is bound by the laws of thermodynamics. See infra text
accompanying notes 217-222. More importantly. there appeal to be significant current
constraints on the availability of solar energy fin. human appropriation, given that one
cannot advance the rate of solar entropic flow. See infra text accompanying notes' 70-287.
66 Georgescu-Roegen, supra note 57, at 85.
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of consumption habits, and other policy measures as part of this pru-
dent management. 67
It bears noting that Georegescu-Roegen's conclusion that hu-
manity should "have a lifespan as long as it is compatible with its
dowry of low entropy" represents a conflation of the concept of scale
and the norm of sustainability.6g As described above fig ecological eco-
nomics does not require one to accept the goal of lengthening the
survival of the species at any cost; rather, it requires one to acknowl-
edge that some decision about intergenerational resource distribution
must be made. From the perspective of ecological economics, Geor-
gescu-Roegen's main accomplishment was in throwing down a theo-
retical gauntlet to which mainstream economics has yet to respond.
The failure to refute or even address the logic of Georgescu-Roegen's
argument created a void in standard economic analysis that ecological
economics has sought to fill.
4. The Emergence of Ecological Economics
In 1973, Herman Daly published a collection of essays, including
the three just discussed, that marked the formal arrival of ecological
economics as a field of study." The subject could only be described as
transdisciplinary, utilizing concepts from a variety of fields including
economics, ecology, biology, and physics, yet grounded in a set of
foundational principles unique to it. Following this genesis, ecological
economics gained steady acceptance until "[i] t now boasts several re-
search institutes around the world, as well as the 1500-member Inter-
national Society for Ecological Economics."71 Since the Brundtland
Commission focused the world's attention on the concept of
sustainability in 1987,72 ecological economics has only grown in
prominence: no discipline has been more concerned with defining a
sustainable level of human activity within the natural ecosystem than
67 See Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths, in VALUING THE EARTH:
ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 89, 103-05 (Herman E. Daly Kenneth N. Townsend eds.,
1903).
65 Georgescu-Roegen, supra note 57, at 85.
cs See supra text accompanying note 22.
70 SeETOWARD A STEADY-STATE ECONOMY (Herman E. Daly ed., 1973).
71 Jeff Gersh, Bigger, BaddeBlit Not Better, Tin: Amicus JOURNAL, Jan. 1, 1999, at 32,
35.
72 See Susan L. Smith, Ecologically Sustainable Development; Integrating Economics, Ecology,
and Law, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 261, 272-73 (1995) ("The Brundtland Report catapulted
the principle of sustainable development to paramount international significance.").
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ecological economics. As a result, international leaders are increas-
ingly turning to its practitioners for guidance.	 4
Throughout this development, most have considered Herman
Daly the intellectual figurehead of ecological economics." For twenty-
five years, Daly has been challenging growth economic orthodoxy and
championing the discipline of ecological economics. He taught at
Louisiana State University for two decades before his views on the
mixed value of economic growth attracted the attention of Robert
Goodland at the World Bank." Goodland hired Daly to act as a senior
economist at the World Bank for six years, during which Daly vigor-
ously lobbied from within to change the Bank's institutional disregard
of the environmental costs of its projects." After resigning from the
World Bank in 1994, Daly assumed his current position at the School
of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland. His views achieved in-
ternational recognition in 1996 when he was awarded, appropriately,
the "alternative Nobel Prize."'"
B. Some Fundamentals
Although the. field is still relatively new and ill-formed, several
fundamental concepts have gained sufficient acceptance to be called
"standard" ecological economics. This Section examines those con-
cepts m detail.
1. The Relationship Between Ecological and Economic Systems
"The vision of modern economics in general, and especially of
macroeconomics, is the familiar circular flow diagram."" The econ-
omy is viewed as a self-contained system within which exchange value
circulates between producers and consumers. The macroeconomic
loop makes no accounting of the actual resource materials from
Sreil-Md. Economist honored in Netherlands, WASIL Pos't', Apr. 12, 1996, at 113 (describ-
ing Daly as "one of the first economists to focus on environmental problems and ... the
founder of the new discipline of ecological economics").
74 See G. Pascal Zachary, 'Green Economist' Warns Growth May Be Overrated, WALL ST.
June 25, 1996, at 131.
75
 See id.
75 See Economist at UAl Wins 'Alternative Nobel Mize,' BALT. SUN, Oct. 3, 1996, at 13A (not-
ing that Daly was awarded an honorary Right Livelihood Award for fostering a discipline
"that integrates the key elements of ethics, quality of life, environment and community, ID
contrast to the mainstreams obsession with quantitative economic growth and free trade").
Herman E. Daly, Elements of Environmental Macroeconomics, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOM-
ICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 32, 33 (Robert Costanza ed.,
1991).
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which goods are produced, or the waste matter into which goods are
transformed during consumption. Physical dimensions of economic
activity simply do not exist in the textbook circular flow diagram.
Thus, resource depletion, environmental pollution, impairment of
necessary environmental services such as water filtration or carbon
absorption, or indeed any other relationship between economic activ-
ity and factors outside of the narrow universe of value exchange are
ignored by standard macroeconomics. As Daly put it, "It is exactly as if
a biology textbook proposed to study an animal only in terms of its
circulatory system, without ever mentioning its digestive tract . .." 78
Ecological economists believe that this conception is misguided.
Human economic activity impacts the ecological sphere in all phases
of production and consumption, in ways both patently obvious, such
as the clear-cutting that has occurred in the majority of the forested
areas of the globe, 79 and deceptively subtle, such as the rise of green-
house gases in the atmosphere from 277 ppmv (parts per million by
volume) to 367 ppmv since pre-Industrial times.84 Humans are draw-
ing down natural resources at rates that are geologically significant.
The Ogallala aquifer, a massive underground source of filtered fresh
water which lies beneath several states in the U.S. Great Plains, stood
at a relatively constant level for millions of years. In recent decades,
however, agricultural irrigation has caused the fossil groundwater to
drop at an annual rate of four to six feet, compared to a natural re-
charge rate of only about one-half inch per year. 81 The aquifer's shal-
low southern reaches have already been depleted, causing irrigated
land in Texas to shrink by 117.0.82
Humans are diverting resources from their ecological paths, caus-
ing unforeseen and often harmful consequences. The Colorado River,
whose annual water flow is allocated to industrial, agricultural, and
municipal uses through a massive system of ten major dalns, 83
 has
78 DA ix, supra imt c 58, at 1 93.
79 See Janet N. Abramovitz & Ashley T. Mattoon, Reorienting the Forest Products Economy,
in STATE OF THE WORLD 60, 60 (Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1999) (noting that "Metween
1980 and 1995 alone, at least 200 million hectares of forest were lost—an area larger than
Mexico").
80
 LEsTER R. BROWN, ET AL., VITAL SIGNS 60 (Linda Starke ed., 1999).
Si See MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 455 (1986).
82 See Lester R. Brown, Facing Food Scarcity, in THE WORLDWATCH READER ON GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 215, 222 (Lester R. Brown & Ed Ayres eds., 1908).
83 See Sandra Postel, 117tere Have All the Rivers Gone?, in THE WORLDWATCII READER ON
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 173, 178 (Lester R. Brown & Ed Ayres eds., 1998).
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rarely reached its mouth in the Gulf of California since 1993. 84 The
resulting salinization of water in the Gulf has decimated shrimp and
other fisheries while straining the lives of area fishermen. 85
Humans are setting in motion complex feedback loops whose
little-understood mechanisms could become self-perpetuating. Melt-
ing of polar ice caps through global warming could cause the release
of billions of tons of methane gas trapped beneath crystal structures
on the edges of continental shelves.86 One cubic meter of this meth-
ane gas has the same ultraviolet radiation trapping effect as twenty
cubic meters of carbon dioxide, the most voluminous greenhouse gas
produced by human activity. 87
In light of scientific theory and empirical evidence, therefore,
ecological economists argue that the macroeconomic conception of
market activity as an isolated system is erroneous. The economy ap-
pears to be limited by the constraints of nature. Or, as former Wiscon-
sin governor Gaylord Nelson succinctly put it, "The economy is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the environment." 88
Nevertheless, even international institutions such as the World
Bank continue to rely on the rarefied macroeconomic conception of
exchange found at the beginning of standard texts. 89 As Daly notes,
"Things are no better when [one] turn [s] to the advanced chapters at
the end of most macroeconomic texts, where the topic is growth the-
ory"99 For years the theory was stated as a simple function involving K
and L, capital and labor. Resource flows and waste output flows were
not even a factor in the equation. Thus, the only constraints on eco-
nomic growth appeared to be the availability of man-made capital and
human labor. The limitations of this conception can be demonstrated
by a simple example. The United Nations currently estimates that all
seventeen of the world's major fisheries are being fished at or beyond
capacity, and nine are in serious decline. 91 In such a situation, the
84 See Brown, supra note 82, at 223.
115 See Posiel, supra note 83, at 179-80.
86 See Peter Bully:wit, I low Climate Chang)? Could ,Spiral Out of Control, 29 Ettot.ocasT 68,
71 (1999).
R7 See id,
"Gersli, supra note 71, at 34.
89 See MLA', supra note 58, at 5-6 (recounting failed attempts to introduce any concept
of the environment into a World Bank diagram that purported to show, The Relationship
Between the Economy sn it the Environment").
" Id. at 47.
91 See Peter Weber, It Comes Down to the Coasts, in Tim WORLDWATCH READER ON
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 79,86 (Lester R. Brown & Ed Ayres eds., 1998).
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limit to economic growth is not the number of boats or fishermen;
rather, the limit is the number of fish.
More recent attempts by economists such as Joseph Stiglitz to in-
troduce resource flows into growth theory92 have also been chal-
lenged by ecological economists. In these revised equations, "the pro-
duction function is almost always a multiplicative form ... in which R
[resource flows] can approach zero with Y [aggregate production]
constant if only we increase K or L in a compensatory fashion,"93 The
idea behind this formulation is that increased use of man-made capi-
tal and labor can compensate for reductions in the availability of
natural resources or waste assimilative capacity. "Resources are seen as
`necessary' for production, but the amount required can be as little as
one likes ...."94 Ecological economists believe that this brand of po-
tential growth is also problematic—an increase in the absolute
amount of man-made capital or labor generally entails an increase in
the depletion of resources or the taxing of assimilative capacity. Such
factors are more properly thought of as complements, not substitutes.
As an example of the orthodox view, many economic forecasters
view China, with its 1.2 billion people, as an untapped market for
goods associated with the affluent Western lifestyle 95 In other words,
forecasters see the glimmer of economic growth in the development
of China. Other commentators, however, argue that if the entire Chi-
nese population were to adopt the lifestyle of consumers in a nation
like the United States, the consequent ecological footprint would be
catastrophic 95 Indeed, it does not appear that the Chinese could even
eat like Americans, let alone buy, build, drive, and discard like Ameri-
cans: "If the current world grain harvest, averaging 1.75 billion tons
thus far during the 1990s, were boosted by roughly 15 percent to 2
billion tons, that harvest—if equitably distributed—could support
[only] 2.5 billion people at the American level of consumption."'" To
92 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Growth with Exhaustible Natural Resources: Efficient and Optimal
Growth Paths, 41 REv. ECON. STUDIES 123, 124 (1974).
" DALY, stip/TT note 58, at 48.
9.1
Str, e.g., jot IN NAlsnrrr, MEGATRENos ASIA 87 (1996) (reporting that "a billion Chi-
nese want to become rich and buy millions of 'I'Vs, washing machines, refrigerators anti
videocassette recorders"); id. at 92 (arguing that China's recent growth trend will result in
a $7.2 trillion economy by 2001, equal in size to the current U.S. economy).
96. See Lester R. Brown, 'no Will Feed China?, in THE IATORLDWATCH READER ON GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 196 (Lester R. Brown & Ed Ayres eds., 1998).
97 Brown, supra note 82, at 229. Thus, China's 1.2 billion people would consume nearly
half of total global grain output, leaving the world's remaining 4.5 billion people strug-
gling to obtain even subsistence levels of food. See id.
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be sure, growth in consumption levels in China will be accompanied
by growth in the nation's own productive capacity. It is far from clear,
however, that arable land and agricultural productivity can be multi-
plied in the way that factories  can. 98
2. The Laws of Thermodynamics
Assuming that environmental frontiers are not limitless, econom-
ics as the science of scarcity therefore must. confront the scarcity of
natural as well as man-made resources. While mainstream economists
believe that they have found a theoretical avenue around this chal-
lenge , 99 ecological economists confront it directly, incorporating the
laws of thermodynamics into their analysis in order to better under-
stand the quality of physical exchanges that occur between the eco-
logical system and the economic subsystem. As Georgescu-Roegen
demonstrated, such application reveals a disturbing truth about hu-
man economic activity (and indeed, about all activity within the mate-
rial universe). The fixed quantum of matter-energy with which the
universe is endowed must necessarily move from a state of high-
availability to low-availability, of low-entropy to high-entropy, and of
order to chaos. Thus, physical throughput in the human economy
must always be conceived of as at least a partial liquidation of capital,
rather than a mere expenditure of income.
For ecological economists, such cold fatalism is not cause for de-
spair; it is cause for reform. Humanity is somewhat in control of the
rate with which it advances entropic activity. A solar heated house only
utilizes an infinitesimal fraction of the sun's several billion years of
activity. A house heated by coal-firecl electricity, on the other hand,
transforms millions of years of condensed solar energy into green-
house gases that persist in the atmosphere for decades. The economic
argument for refusing to adopt the use of renewable energy sources
immediately, on a widespread basis, is no longer as strong as it once
was. The cost of solar cells has declined from more than $70 per watt
in the 1970s to $4 per watt today (in 1994 dollars), while the world
market has grown from 34 megawatts in 1988 to an estimated 125
megawatts in 1997. 100 The fastest growing energy market in the past
decade has not been oil, coal, or natural gas, but wind power, growing
138 See infra text accompanying notes 216-287.
" See infra text accompanying notes 256-287.
100 Christopher Flavin, The Next Energy Rwandan, in THE WORLDWAT011 READER ON
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs 56, 61 (Lester R. Brown & Ed Ayres eds., 1998).
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from 2000 megawatts in 1990 to 7600 megawatts in 1997, 101 and re-
markably achieving cost-competitiveness with its heavily subsidized,
arguably unsustainable counterparts.m But most of this development
is occurring outside of the United States. Nations such as China, Mex-
ico, Kenya, and Vietnam all currently use solar electrification to pro-
vide power to remote rural villages.m In the view of ecological
economists, nothing prevents industrialized nations such as the
United States from doing the same besides entrenched political
power and a failure to perceive the true costs of current practices. In
light of this situation, Georgescu-Roegen's famous warning should be
updated. It is not that Cadillacs prevent future spades and plows; it is
that sport-utility vehicles prevent future wind turbines and solar cells.
3. Optimal Scale and Sustainability
The .foregoing discussion establishes another of the foundational
principles of ecological economics: "The macroeconomy is an open
subsystem of the ecosystem and is totally dependent upon it, both as a
source for inputs of low
-entropy matter-energy and as a sink for out-
puts of high-entropy matter-energy."104 Given such a conception, an
inescapable question arises regarding how much the economic subsys-
tem can grow before it places an unsustainable burden on the natural
ecosystem. Conventional economists fail to address this issue because
the macroeconomy is conceived of as the superstructure—conceptu-
ally, nothing exists "around" the macroeconomy. Thus, there is no
reason to suspect that it cannot grow ad infinitum.
As Daly has noted, this failing is surprising given that every other
economic concept involves a limit or point at which marginal benefits
do not exceed marginal costs. 105
 More than one commentator has
speculated that the disappearance of limits in macroeconomics serves
as a theoretical expedient to avoid difficult questions of distribu-
tion. 106
 Instead of adopting such an approach, Daly argues that the
101 See id. at 57.
102
 Christopher Flavin & Seth Dunn, Reinventing the Energy System, in STATE OF THE
WORLD 22, 28 (Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1999) ("Wind power is now economically com-
petitive with fossil fuel generated electricity, and the market, valued at roughly $2 billion in
1998, is growing more than 25 percent annually.").
1 °3 See Flavin, supra note 100; at 60.
See Daly, saprn note 77, at 35.
05 See DALY, supra note 58, at 27.
106 See, e.g., id. at 7 (noting that the World Bank "cannot acknowledge limits to growth
because growth is seen as the solution to poverty").
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logic of marginal analysis must apply with equal force to macroeco-
nomics—that is, there must be a point at which the benefits from an
increase in the scale of the economy are outweighed by the environ-
mental and social costs entailed by such an increase. 107 Economists
and other thinkers interested in the welfare of humanity must there-
fore confront the issue of determining the optimal scale of the econ-
omy.
The most widely cited attempt to articulate a principle for limit-
ing the scale of economic activity conies from the 1987 report of the
United Nations World Commission on Eiwiromnent and Develop-
ment, popularly known as the Brundtland Report. 108 This report urged
nations to undergo only sustainable development, which it defined as
development that "meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 109
As Susan Smith has explained, two principles underlie this notion of
sustainable development: "[T]tle Earth's finite capacity to accommo-
date people and industrial development, and a moral imperative not
to deprive future generations of natural resources essential to well-
being and quality of environment."" ) Following the release of the
Brundtland Report, several international agreements and statements of
principles have further developed this goal of keeping human activity
within the carrying capacity of the earth, including the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 111 the Convention on Biological Di-
versity,'" the Rio Declaration, 113 Agenda 21, 114 and the Statement of
Forest Principles. 115
While these developments were initially viewed as an important
step toward reaching a consensus to restrict the scale of the global
economy, they have come under fire more recently for lacking the
conceptual clarity needed to avoid unsustainable growth. Among eco-
logical economists, Daly has been especially critical of the Brundtland
1°7 See id. at 27.
1°8 WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
(1987).
109 1d. at 8.
110 Smith, supra note 72, at 2(12-63.
m Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 LL.M. 849 (1992).
112 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
118 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 1.L.M. 874 (1992).
114 1 AGENDA 21 AND Tut ucEn PROCEEDINGS, U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1992).
115 Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation
and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992).
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Report's ambiguity: "Sustainable development is a term that everyone
likes, but nobody is sure of what it means." 118 Although the interna-
tional community has agreed that it should not compromise the
"needs" of future generations, it has not attempted to define what
those "needs" will be. Should future generations be afforded only the
natural resources necessary to maintain a basic level of subsistence?
Should the "aesthetic" needs of the unborn be considered within the
sustainable development rubric? What assumptions should be made
about the ability of technological advancements to alleviate resource
scarcities in the future? What type of allowance should be made for
the limit of science's ability to recognize and assess the impact of eco-
nomic activity on ecosystem viability?
By leaving these and other difficult questions unanswered, the
Brundtland Commission was able to achieve broad support for its
guidelines. However, because of the conceptual looseness inherent in
the notion of sustainable development, and because of the wide dis-
agreement over its proper interpretation, the principle can and has
been co-opted by just about any group with an interest in the de-
bate.tt" At times, this co-opting results in advocacy totally divorced
from the foundational principles of sustainable development, as when
policymakers aspire to "sustainable growth in the rate of increase of
economic activity."" 8 Failing to understand that the Brundtland Re-
port's thesis was that economic growth cannot continue indefinitely,
these bullish thinkers advocate infinite acceleration in the rate of
infinite growth.
In contrast to such vague verbiage, Daly has advocated the neces-
sity of a "steady-state economy" in which the scale of human economic
activity—that is, "the physical scale or size of the human presence in
the ecosystem as measured by population times per capita resource
use"10—does not exceed the point at which marginal macroeconomic
benefits equal macroeconomic costs. 128 Economists have typically ig-
nmx, supra note 58, at I.
117 See id. at 2 ("Acceptance of a largely undefined term sets the stage for a situation
where whoever can pin his or her definition to the term will automatically will a large po-
litical battle for influence over our future.").
" 8 Herman E. Daly; Sustainable Growth: An Impossibility Theomn (1990), reprinted in
VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 267, 269 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth
N. Townsend eds., 1993).
119 DALY, supra note 58, at 50.
129 See id. at 3. The classical economist Mill supported a similar notion, which he called
the stationary state, in which the size of a population and its capital stock remained con-
stant while technological and cultural improvements continued. See supra notes 27, 38.
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noted this type of marginal analysis at the macroeconomic level, opt-
ing to believe that micro-level consumption choices generally reflect
Pareto improvements, and that therefore the aggregate of such
choices must also reflect enhancements in social welfare.'" in Daly's
view, however, prices only measure the scarcity of resources relative to
each , other."2 Micro-level choices may result in au efficient allocation
of resources in relation to everything else, but they cannot determine
an efficient absolute level of resource use. Therefore, just as full em-
ployment and fair distribution are macroeconomic goals that are not
fully resolved by unfettered microeconomic activity, Daly believes that
optimal scale is an issue that must be addressed by policy instruments
operating on a macroeconomic level. 125
"A necessary requirement for this optimal scale is that the econ-
omy's throughput—the flow beginning with raw material inputs, fol-
lowed by their conversion into commodities, and finally into waste
outputs—be within the regenerative and absorptive capacities of the
ecosystem." 124 In other words, in order to be truly sustainable, the ma-
terial scale of the economy must be within the carrying capacity of the
earth. Giving flesh to the concept of "carrying capacity" is a challeng-
ing task that needs to be addressed before Daly's sustainable devel-
opment can become a fully operable concept. Daly provides two fun-
damental principles toward that end: "Renewable resources should be
exploited in a manner such that: (1) harvesting rates do not exceed
regeneration rates; and (2) waste emissions do not exceed the renew-
able assimilative capacity of the local environment." 125 Non-renewable
resources should be depleted at a rate equal to the rate of creation of
renewable substitutes." 6
These principles of resource use, however, are only the first step
in what is an essentially scientific exercise. Determining whether a
given level of population and per capita resource use is sustainable
121 To be sure, economists such as Nobel laureate Robert Lucas have developed the
"microfoundations" of macroeconomics by exploring how the aggregation of individual
rational behavior can 'impact (anal undermine) Keynesian economic theories. See V.V.
Chari, Nobel Laureate Robed E. !Aram, In: Archilea of Modern Macroeconomics, 12 J. EcON.
PERsr. 171 (Winter 1998). They generally have not, however, asked the far more basic
question that Daly is asking: whether an increase in total output. costs more than it is
worth. See infra text accompanying notes 132-172.
122 See DALY, supra note 58, at 27.
123 See id. at 51.
121 Id. at 27-28.
121 DALY, SUPER tote 118, at 271.
126 See id. at 271.
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requires the expertise of ecologists, biologists, and environmental sci-
entists, as well as economists. In Daly's view, the practitioners of eco-
nomics should continue to practice their bread and butter of maxi-
mizing the market's allocative efficiency, but only after the optimal
scale of that market has been determined by social consensus with
input from both economic and noneconomic experts.I 27
A second task that is not exclusively economic involves determin-
ing the desirable mix of population size and resource intensity that
will be used to consume society's annual quota of natural capital and
services. As noted above, the scale or level of physical throughput in
the economy can be thought of as the product of population times
per capita resource use. 128 This definition implies that a smaller popu-
lation could lead a more resource-intensive lifestyle than a larger one,
while staying within ecologically-imposed constraints of sustainability.
Conversely, a larger population must reduce its per capita resource
use in order to maintain the ecological footprint of a smaller one. Be-
cause the level of throughput must not be allowed to exceed the point
at which ecosystem losses exceed economic gains, society must make a
conscious tradeoff between these two determinant factors of the scale
of its economy. Obviously, such a tradeoff entails a moral, not merely
an economic, choice. Figure 1 summarizes the foregoing discussion.
Figure 1
Popular ion
127 See id. at 271-72.
128 See id. at 270.
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The x-axis gives the earth's human population while the y-axis
represents the per capita material resource use of that population.
The product of these two factors gives the overall scale of material
throughput in the economy. Two bold lines are superimposed on the
graph to represent constraints on the attainable level of throughput at
any given population size: the productive capacity of the human
economy and the carrying capacity of the earth. The former generally
increases with population size, while the latter decreases. 129 Daly's
steady-state economy, in which throughput remains relatively constant
and always within the carrying capacity of the environment, is repre-
sented by the dashed curve. A necessary implication of the steady-
state economy is that as population increases along the curve, per
capita material resource use must correspondingly decrease.
The majority of human economic history has occurred on the
left half of the graph, in which the relevant limiting factor on
throughput is not the carrying capacity of the ecological sphere, but
instead the productive capacity of the human. This is Boulding's
"cowboy economy" in which the logical goal seems to be relentless
pursuit of increases in human economic production. 1" Ecological
economists, however, believe that humanity has now moved to the
"spaceman economy" on the right half of the graph, in which human
productive capacity has outstripped the carrying capacity of the earth;
that is, the binding constraint on material throughput is no longer
our capacity to produce, but the earth's capacity to generate resource
inputs and absorb waste outputs. 131 Here, society's challenge is to limit
129 The productive capacity of the human economy generally increases with popilla-
don size due to the increased availability of labor and, to a less quantifiable extent, greaser
opportunities For improvements in technology, skills, and knowledge. The carrying capac-
ity of the earth decreases With population size, however, because the earth's finite endow-
ment of natural capital must he spread among an ever-growing number of people. Note
that this is not, strictly speaking, a Malthusian argument. Malthus believed that humanity
would eventually Nce social and ecological ruin because it was incapable of checking
population growth. See generally TOOMAS ROBERT MAcimus, AN ESSAY ON Tim PRINCIPLE
OF POPUI.PnTION (1798). History has of course proven Malthus wrong, at least with respect
to a significant number of societies in the late twentieth century. See Reed Boland, The
Environment, Population, and Women !s Human Rights, 27 ENVTL. L. 1137, 1188 (1997) (not-
ing that "Iplopulation stabilization has been achieved in some thirty countries"). Ecologi-
cal economists accept Malthus's premise that many natural resources cannot he replicated
exponentially in the way that population size can, but they emphatically reject. the proposi-
tion that there is something inevitable about population growth. Indeed, the very notion
of regulating scale presupposes some ability on the part of society to regulate its popula-
tion size (a primary determinant olscale).
I" See Boulding, supra note 28, at 303.
151 See id. at 303.
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economic activity rather than maximize it, a task that will require
vastly different cultural values and political tools than the growth ob-
session of the "cowboy economy."
It is important to note that intensity of material consumption
need not be con-elated with quality of life or welfare. Per capita mate-
rial resource use is a scientific measure of the ecological impact of a
society's consumption habits; it is not a measure of the value that the
society derives from those habits. Put differently, it is quite possible
that reductions in material resource use levels can result in increases
in overall welfare. When a region switches from coal-fired to compa-
rably priced wind-generated electricity, for instance, resource use per
capita drops appreciably with little discernible influence on the con-
sumer's lifestyle. If such reductions in resource intensity bring the re-
gion below the carrying capacity of the ecosystem, then the society
can invest its newly created natural budget surplus in one of several
ways. it can support a larger population at the same per capita re-
source use level, support the current population at a higher resource
use level, or maintain both factors at current levels while deriving psy-
chic benefit from the increased carrying capacity safety margin. Re-
gardless of the region's choice, however, welfare will have improved
over the previous fossil fuel-based economy.
The central point is that welfare and resource intensity, although
undoubtedly related, must still be analyzed as separate concepts. In
the steady-state economy, it is of paramount importance that material
throughput be maintained below limits imposed by the ecosystem.
Welfare, however, can continue to grow as the economy focuses un-
precedented attention on efficiency in the use of resources and the
satisfaction of preferences.
4. Measuring the Human Economy
Economics is fundamentally a quantitative discipline. As Samuel-
son puts it in his renowned textbook, "economics focuses on concepts
that can actually be measured.""2 Following the lead of John Maynard
Keynes and Simon Kuznets, macroeconomists have focused exclu-
sively on quantifying the productive capacity of the human economy.
132 See Clifford Cobb et al., If the GDP Is Up, Vl'hy Is America Down?, 276 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 59,70 (1995) (quoting PAULA. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NoRonAus, ECONOM-
ics (16th ed. 1998)). Economist John Vaizey voiced a pervasive corollary to ibis principle:
"I must confess to an instinctive conviction that what cannot be measured may not exist."
HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN II. CORR, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD 31 (2d ed. 1994) (quoting
JOHN VAIZEY, THE ECONOMICS OF EnucATtoN 14 (1962)).
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However, as seen in the last Section, a second constraint on economic
growth exists—the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. Moreover, even
ignoring ecological limits to growth, there is little reason to suppose
that increases in the sheer magnitude of the human economy are al-
ways desirable from the perspective of social welfare. Recognizing the
practical worth of quantification (and the need to confront conven-
tional economists in their own language), ecological economists have
begun to focus attention on the task of measuring the intersection of
economic and ecological spheres. This Section addresses the response
of ecological economists to traditional indexes of social welfare such
as the gross national product (GNP), while the next Section outlines
efforts to quantify the value of the ecological sphere.
Current national accounting measures produce a variety of re-
sults that would strike noneconomists as odd. For instance, when the
Exxon Valdez oil spill necessitated $2.1 billion in clean-up costs,'" the
U.S. GNP rose by that same amount, despite the fact that ten years
later only two of the twenty-three most damaged wildlife species have
recovered and 40% of area fishermen suffer depression over their de-
stroyed livelihoods."4 Similarly, as Superfund contributors muster the
$31 billion needed to clean the 1355 worst locations on the E.P.A.'s
list of nearly 40,000 hazardous waste sites," 5 GNP views the expendi-
ture as an increase in economic welfare, rather than just a restoration.
GNP also ignores basic accounting principles by treating the unsus-
tainable exploitation of natural capital as pure income. Centuries of
logging and construction have resulted in the loss of all but 1% to 5%
of the original forest cover of the United States, 196 yet GNP has made
no allowance along the way for the depreciation of scarce natural
capital.
Social as well as ecological costs frequently appear as gains under
GNP accounting. When the estimated one third of American adults
1 " See Scott Allen, Deep Problems 10 Years After Exxon Valdez: Mrs, Oil spill in US Has bu-
gling Effects for Alaska, Industries, liosToN GLOBE, Mar. 7, 1999 (page unavailable).
134 See id.
135 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1994 SUPERFUND ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 41-43, 129 (1994).
See Janet N. Abramovitz, Nature's "Free" Services, in WORLDWATCH READER ON
GLOBAL. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 150, 155 (Lester R. Brown & Ed Ayres eds., 1998). Al-
though much of the United States has been "reforested," such monocultural plantations
provide an imperfect substitute for the ecological functions performed by diverse old
growth forests. See 0. Gordon Davis, Land Use Planning in Furtherance of Sustainable Develop-
ment in Asia, 3 WIDENER L Swat , . J. 119, 135-36 (1998) (noting that "converting a natural
forest to a tree farm would impair the carrying capacity of the supporting ecosystem").
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who are obese spent $39 billion in one year on health care costs for
obesity-related diseases,' 37
 the macroeconomic indicators recorded an
unmitigated credit. When the position of the United States as home
to 1.7 million prisoners and the largest incarceration system in the
world necessitated a doubling of state spending on prisons in . the last
decade, 138 GNP rose to reflect the social "progress" of unprecedented
prison construction. And when the American divorce rate doubled
between 1970 and the present,'" GNP recorded an increase from the
real estate transactions, attorney bills, and other expenditures necessi-
tated by the higher number of family fractures. 140
Such arguably counterintuitive results are an outgrowth of the
"cowboy economy" in which more of anything is simply better, regard-
less of what it is. Standard national accounting measures such as GNP,
and more recently gross domestic product (GDP), seek only to quan-
tify the value of monetary transactions that occur in a given economy,
with no distinction among purposes and no recognition of adverse
consequences that result from such transactions, No allowance is
made for the irreversible depletion of natural resource inputs, or the
externalized costs of waste outputs. Indeed, such environmental costs
are frequently treated as economic gains, leading to a perverse na-
tional incentive structure: A policy of maximizing GNP is "practically
equivalent to a policy of maximizing depletion and pollution." 141
Nor is any accounting attempted of other "noneconomic"
spheres such as the livelihood of communities, the stability of families,
or the safety of schools. Unexamined pursuit of increases in GNP can
lead to parasitic growth. Commercialization of social functions tradi-
tionally performed outside the economic sphere—such as the re-
placement of stay-at-home parenting by child care, prepared meals by
convenience food, social networks by self-help tapes, and community
n Scott Petersen, Discrimination Against Overweight People: Can Society Still Get Away with
It?, 130 GONZ. L. REV. 105,108 (1994).
138
 Jonathan Kanfman, Frustration With Crime ll'ave, and Criminals, Led lb a Huge Surge in
the Construction ofJail Cells, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27,1998, at A18.
139 See Maggie Gallagher, Fatherless Boys Grow Up Into Dangerous Alen, WALL Sr. J., Dec. 1,
1998, at A22.
14° Similar examples abound. See, e.g., Cobb et al., supra note 132, at 70-72 (citing
crime, divorce, mass-media addiction, natural disaster relief, and other examples of
anomalous "growth"); Herman E. Daly, Introduction to Essays Toward a Steady late Economy,
reprinted in VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 11, 40-41 (Herman E.
Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 1993) (noting that the medical hills necessitated by
cigarette induced cancer and pollution induced-emphysema are added to GNP, and calling
such expenditures "swelling, not growth").
111 DALY, supra note 58, at 41.
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activities by commercial entertainment—is a consequence encour-
aged by any national agenda that seeks to maximize GNP.
Nobel Prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets, one of the chief
architects of the concept of GNP, warned that the measurement of
GNP should never be mistaken for true national progress: "Distinc-
tions must be kept in mind between quantity and quality of growth,
between its costs and return, and between the short and the long run.
Goals for 'more' growth should specify more growth of what and for
what."142 Many policymakers, however; have largely ignored this ad-
vice, seeking continual, indiscriminate growth in GNP as the ready
salve for all manner of national problems. Ecological economists, on
the other hand, have criticized GNP as a concept that fosters unsus-
tainable economic practices while failing to achieve its aim of ap-
proximating human welfare. In its stead, Daly and theologian John
Cobb, Jr., have offered a substitute national wealth accounting meas-
ure that corrects for many of the GNP's failings. 193
Called the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), Daly
and Cobb's measure begins with total consumption expenditure data
gathered by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and then proceeds
to make a series of adjustments to arrive at a best estimate of sustain-
able economic welfare. The first adjustment, for income inequality,
attempts to account for the fact that "an additional thousand dollars
in income adds more to the welfare of a poor family than it does to a
rich family."144 This notion, which many accept as a consequence of
the principle of diminishing marginal utility of income, has important
implications for the calculation of economic welfare. If income distri-
bution becomes more uneven over a period of time, unadjusted dol-
lar flows for that period will overstate welfare. To correct for this dis-
142 Cobb et al., supra note 132, at 67 (quoting Runlets).
143 See DALY & Coats, supra note 132, at 443-507. Many others have conducted similar
exercises. Robert Eisner, for instance, has been championing a major reform of national
income accounting for two decades. See Robert Eisner, The Total Incomes System of Accounts,
65 SURV. OF CURRENT BUS. 24, 24-48 (1985); Robert Eisner, Total Incomes in the United
States, 1939 and 1969, 24 RENT. OF INCOME & WF.A1;111 41, 41-70 (1978). Even before Eisner,
William Nordhaus and James Tobin discussed the adjustment of GNP for a variety or fac-
tors, including Correction for certain disamenifies of tirlmnization, reclassification of ex-
penditures into consumption, investment, and intermediate categories, and imputation of
service value from consumer durables, leisure, and household work. See William Nordhaus
James Tobin, Is Growth Ohsolete?, in ECONOMIC GROWTI I I (National Bureau of Economic
Research ed., 1972).
144 DALY & Coal;, supra note 132, at 445.
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tortion, Daly and Cobb alter consumption expenditure data to reflect
the degree of income inequality in the economy. 145
Next, Daly and Cobb add factors representing positive income
streams from four sources that are currently absent from official con-
sumption data—household labor,"6 existing consumer durables, 147
public streets and highways,I48
 and public spending on health and
education. 149 Conversely, deductions are made for expenditures that
arguably do not contribute to improvement in economic welfare. For
example, a portion of private spending OIL education is deducted to
represent the "competitive" nature of such spending. 150
 Similarly, the
authors disallow sonic private expenditures on health care because
they view them as attributable to "growing health risks due to urbani-
zation and indastrialization." 151 Other costs deducted from total ex-
145 See id. at 464-65. The authors achieve this adjustment by using an income inequal-
ity index in which the distribution of income in 1950 serves as a neutral baseline. See id. at
465. Thus, when income inequality decreased during the 1960s, ISSN' rose. Conversely,
when greater inequities in income distribution occurred during the mid-1970s and 1980s,
ISSN' fell. See id. at 493.
146 See id. at 458.
117 Current national accounting systems simply calculate all expenditures on consumer
durables as current income, rather than attempting to separate the transactions into a
capital expense and an income stream. This leads to the ironic result that shoddy products
necessitating rapid replacement indicate rising economic "welfare." See id. at 466. Daly and
Cobb take the more appropriate accounting approach ol' treating spending on consumer
durables as a capital investment; thus, they exclude current consumer durables expendi-
tures but impute an annual income component to the total ineRSIIIV of economic Welfare.
"9 See id. at 467-68.
149 See id. at 468-69. The authors do not count all of public health and education ex-
penditures because they view much of the costs as "defensive" in nature. Citing Lester
Thurow's model of education as a sorting mechanism to signal "trainability" rather than
enhanced productive skill, see Lesley C. Thuirow, Education and Economic Equality, in THE
"INNUALITY" CONTROVERSY: SCHOOLING AND DISTRIBUTIVE: JUSTICE 1 70, 172 (Donald M.
Levine & Mary Jo Bane eds., 1975), Daly and Cobb argue that much of education spend-
ing represents an attempt to maintain competitive employment status, rather than an ac-
tual improvement in die stock of human capital. in other words, people attend school
because the failure to attend would mean falling behind in the competition for diplomas
or degrees that confer higher incomes on their recipients." DALY & COBB, Silpia DOC 132,
at 468.
This aspect of Daly and Cobb's calculation is open to considerable challenge. Even if
competitive educational expenditures Fail to increase one's relative position in society and
Jail to increase national productivity, there still may be an intrinsic benefit from educa-
tional experience that accrues to the individual and should be counted as a contribution
to social welfare. In other words, Daly and Cobb's view of education as requiring tangible
benefits to be considered welfare-enhancing may be an example of the same narrow eco-
nomic perspective that they are attempting to reform.
159
 See supra note 149.
151 DALY & COBB, supra note 132, at 969.
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penditures because of their "defensive" nature include the costs of
commuting, 152 purchases of personal pollution control equipment
such as air and water filters, 155 and damages due to vehicular acci-
dents)54
Having attempted to refine the calculation of economic welfare
in accord with certain social realities, Daly and Cobb then turn to the
realities of the environment in relation to the economic subsystem.
They first deduct amounts relating to the current environmental
damage imposed by economic activity, including the annual cost of
water pollution,155 air pollution,156 noise pollution,157 loss of wet-
lands, 158 and loss of farmland. 159 These costs are the least controversial
of Daly and Cobb's estimates of environmental damage, as they repre-
sent tangible, present costs with little scientific dispute as to their exis-
tence. 160 Moreover, the authors adopt a purposefully conservative ap-
proach to valuation of these costs. For instance, they do not include
the costs of water pollution from nonpoint sources 161 or the health-
related costs of air pollution. 162
The authors also attempt to account for the long-term environ-
mental costs associated with economic activity. First, Daly and Cobb
recognize that the consumption of nonrenewable resources consti-
tutes in part "a cost borne by future generations that should be sub-
tracted from (debited to) the capital account of the current genera-
152 See id. al 469-70.
155 See id. at 470.
154 See id. at 471 (calling such expenses a "real cost of industrialization and higher
traffic densities").
155 See id. at 471-74,
156 DALY & COBB, sepia noic 132, at 474-77.
157 See id. at 477.
158 See id. at 477-78.
156 See id. al 478-82.
16° Although causation may not he scientifically contested, valuation is always a difficult
issue. See id. at 471.
IN DA iN Sc Conn, supra note 132, at 471.
102 See id. at 475-76. Nevertheless, some might contend that at least some of Daly and
Cobb's current environmental costs do not impact overall welfare. For instance, some
might argue that the loss of wetlands and farmland should not be considered an economic
cost as these areas are likely being converted to other economically productive purposes.
Regardless of the purpose for which the land is developed, however, there are still real
costs associated with conversion inasmuch as humans have no reliable substitute for many
of the services provided by wetlands and farmlands. Thus, if one is to credit the consumer
dollars spent at a new suburban shopping mall, then one Inns( also debit the irretrievable
loss of arable land unit was covered in the process. Daly Mid Cobb are merely attempting
to arrive at a net figure for the value of industrialization—any other approach would pro-
vide a less than full depiction of economic welfare.
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tion."165
 To price this cost, the authors rely on the marginal cost of
producing a renewable substitute: "For each unit of nonrenewable
resource depleted, we have estimated the . amount of money that
would have to be invested in a process to create a perpetual stream of
output of a renewable substitute for it."164
 Second, Daly and Cobb un-
dertake the daunting task of estimating the economic impact of long-
term build-up of thermal waste in the environment.' 65 Such account-
ing is of course destined to be inexact, but Daly and Cobb's rough
approximation seems at least preferable to the alternative of measur-
ing the costs of global warming and ozone depletion at precisely zero.
In a final set of adjustments, Daly and Cobb alter ISEW to account for
changes in the domestic and international capital position of the na-
tional economy. 166 These adjustments reflect the fact that current
economic welfare can be maintained only if growth in the domestic
capital stock keeps pace with population growth.
The foregoing calculations are summarized in Table 1, using the
year 1990 as an example. 167
Table 1—Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare
United States-1990 (measured in billions of constant 1972 dollars)
Bureau of Economic Analysis personal consumption data $1,266
personal consumption data adjusted for income distribution 1,164
+ services for household labor + 520
+ services of consumer durables + 225
- spending on consumer durables - 235
services of highways amt streets + 18
+ consumption portion of public spending on health and education + 45
Subtotal $1,737
- defensive private spending on health and education - 63
- cost of commuting and auto accidents - 67
- cost of personal pollution control -5
163 Id. at 482.
161 Id. at 484. Daly and Cobb use the production cost of ethanol, a plant-derived substi-
tute for many uses of oil. See id. at 485. Given the difficulties of producing ethanol on a
large scale, however, the author's selection might overstate nonrenewable depletion costs
as against other renewable energy sources that are less costly to produce and can replace
oil in certain applications.
165 In particular; the authors attempt to assign a dollar figure to a hypothetical annual
set-aside that would he required to compensate future generations fbr the costs associated
with global climate change. See id. at 489-90. A similar methodology is used with respect to
the production of chlowth torocarbons and other ozone-depleting gases. See id. at 490,
its DALY & COBB, Stipia note 132, at 491-92.
161 This table is derived from id. at 462-63, tbIA.1. The total differs from the stun of
the individual items due to rounding.
2001 .1	 Macroeconomic Analysis of Law	 35
'fable 1—Index of Sustain:11)1c Economic Welfare
United States-1990 (measured in billions of constant 1972 dollars)
– cost of current environmental pollution – 39
– loss of wetlands and farmland - 58
– depletion of nonrenewable resources – 313
– cost of long-term environmental harms – 371
+ net capital growth + 29
+1– change in net international investment position – 34
Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare $818
As one can see, while the first subtotal of 1SEW showed a con-
sumer gain of $1737 billion for 1990, the end result revealed only
$818 billion in net economic welfare created during the year. One can
think of the $919 billion differential as a very rough estimate of the
total cost of environmental and. social externalities created by eco-
nomic activity in 1990. Given that this amount is actually greater than
the net value created that year, it is arguably an analytical strain to
continue to refer to environmental and social costs as mere "external-
ities," a term suggesting only minor effects of limited interest. To the
contrary, under Daly and Cobb's calculations, externalities appear to
be a dominant effect of market transactions, suggesting that "it is time
to restructure basic concepts and start with a different set of abstrac-
tions that can embrace what was previously external."168
Contrasting the ISEW with GNP over a time series is also reveal-
ing. According to Daly and Cobb, GNP and 1SEW both rose from
1951 until the 1970s (although the rate of growth in ISEW decreased
from 1.57% to 0.21% between the 1960s and 1970s). 169 In the 1980s,
however, GNP continued to rise while ISEW actually declined by
0.43% per year. 17° This decline suggests that continued increases in
the scale of the human economy (as approximately signaled by in-
creases in GNP) are anti-economic; that is, they impose more welfare
costs than benefits (as signaled by decreases in ISEW). Thus, begin-
ning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States may well
have shifted from the cowboy to the spaceman economy, with all its
attendant problems.
Of course, Daly and Cobb's figures are easily contestable, as
would be any attempt to track and price the total social and environ-
IGH Id. at 37. It is also interesting to note that a capitalist economy featuring such mas-
sive externalities becomes, in some respects, an economy of chaotic socialism. Externalized
costs are borne ultimately by the publicin effect, they are socialized—hut without even
the  ' ' 1 benefit of the central planning efforts associated with socialism.
in Id. at 462-63, tbl.A.1.
170 Id.
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mental costs of human economic activity. Nevertheless, even without
deducting for resource depletion and long-term environmental
costs—the two most controversial and difficult to quantify aspects of
ISEW—the pattern of change in ISEW remains largely the same. 171
This suggests, at an absolute minimum, that undifferentiated growth
in GNP is not necessarily consonant with economic welfare and that
reliance on GNP as a measure of national success should be reevalu-
ated. 172
5. Valuing Ecosystem Services
In addition to reforming the measurement of national accounts,
ecological economists have also devoted significant attention to quan-
tifying the worth of ecosystem services. The attempt to place a mone-
tary value on the elements of nature has long been controversial.
Many view such attempts as an almost heretical failure to appreciate
that nature is "priceless." Rutgers University biologist David Ehrenfeld
provides a representative, if charged, example of this view: "I am
afraid that I don't see much hope for a civilization so stupid that it
demands a quantitative estimate of the value of its own umbilical
cord." Others attack the practice from the opposite extreme, believ-
ing that the survey methods frequently used to price natural resources
are fraught with complexities that . render valuations wildly over-
stated. 174
 Nevertheless, economists, policymakers, and courts continue
" 1
 See id. at 505.
"2
 Redefining Progress, a think tank specializing in the use and improvement of eco-
nomic indicators to guide sustainable policy solutions, has continued Daly and Cobb's
work in the years following 1990. That organization's index, thibbed the Genuine Progress
Indicator (GPI), is sintilar to the ISM hitt acids adjustmetit categories for such factors as
volunteer work, leisure time, crime, and underemployment. The GPI portrays the 1990s as
slipping even further away from sustainable economic activity:
Overall, the decline of the GPI in the 1990s has been the most rapid in five
decades. It suggests that the recent financial boom, with the associated shop-
ping spree, has masked an erosion in the real economy that the conventional
indicators hide. Increasingly the U. S. is living off its capital—social and envi-
ronmental as well as financial. In the parlance of policy experts, the economy
has become rife with "ttnintendett consequences," as well as kneaded though
unspoken ones.
Jonathan Rowe & Mark Anielski, Genuine Progress Indicator 1998: Executive Summary, avail-
able at hup://www.rprogress.org/publications/gpi1998/gpi1998_execsum.hunl
 (last mod-
ified Mar. 1999).
Gersh, supra note 71, at 36.
171 See Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural Re-
source Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic. Fiction, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1029 (1995);
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to place economic values on natural resources through the use of
such techniques as restoration or replacement cost valuations, travel
cost valuations, hedonic pricing, and contingent or willingness-to-pay
valuations)"
Commonly, the practice of commodifying nature occurs in the
context of calculating after-the-fact damages awards for, contamina-
tion of natural resources)" Ecological economists have recently
adopted a different approach, seeking to quantify the value of services
provided by ecosystems before irreversible human disruption)" The
significance of focusing on ecosystem services, rather than natural
resources, is that they are seen by researchers as largely irreplaceable
and therefore more fundamental to human survival. Moreover, while
the economy may be able to signal and adjust to specific resource
scarcities, the services provided by the earth are generally not subject
to economic signaling)" Thus, in order to ensure the long-term
sustainahility of human economic activity, ecological economists be-
lieve that natural : services which lack practical man-made substitutes
should be given a . quantified preSence within economic decisionmak-
ing. By generating even approximate figures for the value of these
services, ecological economists hope to impress upon private and
public decisionmakers the environmental costs of contemplated de-
velopment schemes.
A celebrated example of such thinking can be seen in the City of
New York's decision to reclaim watershed areas in the Catskills moun-
tains rather than 'build a capital-intensive water treatment faCility.rg
The Catskills have long been the, primary source of purified water for
New York City, but in recent years the water failed EPA standards for
drinking water due to developthent in the mountains as well as in-
creased sewage, pesticide, and fertilizer contamination. 180 The city
estimated that a purification plant would cost $4 billion to build plus
annual operating; costs, while restoring the natural integrity of the
Note, "Ask A Silly Question . .": Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 HAM, .
L. REV. 1981 (1992).
176 See Frank 13. Cross, Natural ResourcePamage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV, 269, 297-320
(1989).	 •
176 See id. at 273.
177 A recent. issue of the Stanford Environmental Law Journal contained several articles
on the concept and measurement of ecosystem services. See, e.g., James. Salzman et al.,
Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economies, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVT'L Li. 309 (2001).
"s See infra tot accompanying notes 239-252.
179 See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosysteni Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 893 (1997).
196 See id.
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Catskills through land acquisition and restoration would cost only
around $660 million. 181 Thus, the City decided to invest in "natural
capital" as a more efficient and aesthetically desirable alternative to
the traditional industrial solution.
The City of New York's choice was easy to make because the
treatment plant option: provided a clear and reliable measure of the
worth of the Catskills watershed services. As James Salzman has noted,
"Replacement cost provides an effective method for valuing services
because one can compare dollar investments in natural capital and
physical capital to determine payback periods and overall costs."182
Ecological economists believe that if valuations of ecosystem services
are available to policyrnakers at crucial decision times in that manner,
economic development will become much more consonant with sus-
tainable use patterns. For instance, researchers studying alternative
management strategies for mangrove forests in Indonesia have found
that when nontimber uses, including fish, locally used products, and
erosion control, are included in cost-benefit calculations, sustainable
timber practices are significantly more economic than traditional
ones, yielding $4,800 per hectare rather than merely $3,600. 183
Stanford University biologist Gretchen Daily edited a collection
of studies performing just this type of analysis. Entitled Nature's Serv-
ices: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems, the compendium gathers
valuation essays by ecologists and economists on such diverse ecosys-
tem services as air and water purification, watershed maintenance,
waste treatment, biodiversity regulation, climate stabilization, crop
pollinization, pest control, and soil renewal. 1 e" To give just one exam-
ple of their findings, the researchers estimate that if the nitrogen con-
tent of soil provided by existing natural processes had to be supplied
by commercial fertilizer, the lowest-cost estimate for its agricultural
use in the United States would be $45 billion per year, and for all land
plants worldwide, $320 billion. 185
 Human activities that disrupt the
provision of natural services—such as the impairment of nature's
$320 billion annual production of nitrogen by industrial farming
181 See id.
182 Id. at 894.
188 SeeAbramovitz, supra note 136, at 156.
184 See NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997).
185 See Gretchen C. Daily et al., Ecosystem Services Supplied by Soi4 in NATURE'S SERVICES:
SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 113, 125 (Gretchen C. Daily ed„ 1997).
20011	 Macroeconomic Analysis of Law 	 39
techniques—should have a tangible price placed upon them, however
imperfect, to reflect their ecological effects.
Subsequent work by an international team of researchers led by
University of Maryland ecological economist Robert Costanza calcu-
lated an estimate of the economic value provided by the earth's eco-
systems in their totality. 186 The researchers estimated values for seven-
teen essential services provided by sixteen types of ecosystems around
the world, including open oceans, coastal areas, lakes and rivers, crop-
lands, deserts, forests, and grasslands. 187 Their total figure for the
worth of global ecosystem services ranged from $16 trillion to $54 tril-
lion annually, providing an estimate of nature's macroeconomy that
rivals or exceeds gross world product. 188
Of course, in their totality, ecosystem services consist of the very
ability to support human life, rendering their aggregate value equiva-
lent to the very value one places on human existence. Economic tools
are simply not designed to measure such concepts. By attempting to
price the various subcomponents of ecosystems, however, ecological
economists have begun to speak in a language that economists and
policyinakers can fathom and operationalize. As the Catskills water-
shed and Indonesian mangrove examples point out, the resulting dia-
logue can yield surprising agreement between environmental and
economic interests. The Economists' Statement on Climate Change, signed
by over 2500 economists, including eight Nobel Laureates, offers an
unqualified endorsement of such collaborative exercises in the con-
text of reducing greenhouse emissions: IS] ound economic analysis
shows that there are policy options that would slow climate change
without harming American living standards, and these measures may
in fact improve U.S. productivity in the longer run." 89 Ecological
economists believe that such "sound economic analysis" can become
commonplace in the debate over competing business and environ-
mental concerns.
188 See Robert. Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Serzlices and Natural Capi-
tal, 387 NA'ruint 253 (1997).
187 See id, at 256.
' 88 See id, at 259.
185 Redelilting Progress, lEronomisIs' Statement on Climate Changr, available at 	 p://www.
rprogress.org/publicationsieconstateinent.Inml  (lasi visited October 22, 2001).
40	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 43:1
6. Discount Rates and Intergenerational Equity
A final issue of concern to ecological economists is the use of dis-
count rates in regulatory and investment decisionmaking. 1" When
evaluating a particular investment decision, economists typically re-
duce expected costs and benefits to present value using a discount
rate, or a percentage factor that adjusts the amount of a value over
time. For instance, using a discount rate of 10%, an investment yield-
ing $110 in year two is worth only $100 in year one. If the investment
costs $105 to make in year one, it is not an economic choice. Such
reasoning holds well in the context of paper investment decisions.
However, when the expected yield consists of saved lives, preserved
ecosystem services, and ,other nontangible benefits to present and fu-
ture generations, it is not altogether obvious that the same analysis
should apply. Nevertheless, economists have long taken discounting
to be the appropriate response to questions of environmental impor-
tance. As early as 1913, economists noted that "[t] he primary problem
of conservation, ... expressed in economic language, is the determi-
nation of the proper rate of discount on the future with respect to the
utilization of our natural resources."19 1
Frequently, discount rates are determined based on the prevail-
ing real rate of interest charged in capital markets. 192 However, posi-
tive interest rates, which can be said to represent the growth potential
of man-made capital, are a poor indicator of the growth potential of
natural capital. The fact that capital may grow in a bank at 10% per
year does not necessarily imply that an - old growth forest will regener-
ate at an equal rate. A timber company adopting a 10% discount rate
to determine harvesting schedules will "rationally" clear forests faster
than they can regrow, essentially liquidating the natural capital of the
forest rather than consuming only its annual income. In this manner,
use of positive discount rates in development strategy can lead to an
"optimal" choice that is unsustainable---"the impoverishment of fu-
ture generations as a result of the profligacy of present generations in
190 This issue also has achieved great salience among legal scholars. See, e.g., John J.
Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE
L.J. 1901 (1999); Lisa fleinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE LJ. 1911 (1999) thereinafter
Ileinzerling, Discounting Life]; Lisa Ileinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 39 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. LJ.
2025 (1999); Richard L. Revesz; Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Dis-
counting of Human Lives, 09 CoLum. L. Ray. 941 (1999) .
191 1,. C. Gray, The Economic Possibilities of Conservation, 27 QJ. ECON. 497,515 (1913).
192 See Revesz, supra note 190, at 977-81.
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such cases is not just an incidental, but a desirable outcome of the de-
cision making process."'"
Besides encouraging unsustainable investment strategies, dis-
counting can also discourage ecologically desirable government regu-
lations. Because society must often pay the costs of environmental
regulation long before the benefits accrue, discounting of future costs
and benefits frequently counsels against the adoption of environmen-
tally-protective measures. Daniel Farber and Paul Hemmersbaugh
provide an extreme illustration by positing the case of two alternative
designs for a nuclear .waste repository.'" The designs will cost the
same amount and will both be paid for entirely in the first year. If the
first design is adopted, no workers will be killed during construction
but one billion people will be killed in five hundred years due to a
radiation leak from the repository. If the second design is adopted,
between one and two workers will likely be killed during construction
but no leaks and therefore no deaths will occur in five hundred years.
Using a discount rate of 5%, the regulator selecting between designs
"will choose the first option because one billion lives 500 years hence
have a lower present value than one life today."'" Similar reasoning
applies in less extreme, more common settings. Preventing green-
house gas emissions, water contamination, species extinction, re-
source depletion, and many other environmental harms imposes cur-
rent costs while offering mainly future benefits. As such, the measures
routinely fail cost-benefit analyses that use a high positive discount
rate.
Still, though, the impact of discounting on the environment is
difficult to generalize. As Daly has pointed out, high positive discount
rates can have two competing effects on natural resource exploita-
601096 Although a high rate will shift the allocation of capital and la-
bor to projects that exploit resources more quickly, the rate will also
limit the total number of projects that are undertaken given that ex-
pected project benefits must overcome a higher opportunity cost
value. Conversely, a low discount rate may slow the rate of resource
extraction, but it may also increase the total number of extractive pro-
193 Charles Perrings, Reserved Rationality and the Precautionary Principle: Technological
Change, Time and Uncertainty in Environmental Decision Making, in ECOLOGICAL. ECONOMICS;
TILL SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTA INABILITY 153, 155 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991).
194 Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Ileuatnersbangli, The Shadow of the. Future: Discount Rates,
Later Generations. and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REv. 267, 290 (1993).
195 Id.
199 See DALY, supra note 58, at 50-51.
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jects undertaken by Making the projects appear more economic. 197
Thus, the total effect of discounting on the environment is ambigu-
ous, leading to what Richard Norgaard and Richard Howarth have
called "the conservationist's dilemma:198
Norgaard and Howarth have attempted to solve this dilemma by
separating the questions of intragenerational resource allocation, for
which discounting is an appropriate policy tool, and intergenerational
resource distribution, for which discounting is not.'" Economists fre-
quently recognize that unfettered market outcomes will not necessar-
ily result in a just distribution of resources between generations, just
as they do not necessarily result in distributive justice within genera-
tions. Stiglitz, for instance, noted that "Nhere is .. no presumption
that the intertemporal distribution of income which emerges from
the market solution will be 'socially optimal . . .'"2°° Most economists,
however, believe that the use of a discount rate is sufficient to solve
the problem of intergenerational equity. As Stiglitz put it, "if the gov-
ernment correctly controls the rate of interest ... then there would
be no objection to the competitive determination of the rate of utili-
zation of our natural resources."201
However, as Norgaard and Howarth point out, the discount rate
cannot simultaneously serve the purpose of intragenerational alloca-
tive efficiency and intergenerational distributive equity. As noted
above,202
 governments often look to market rates of interest in setting
discount rates for policy proposals, yet interest rates, like prices, quan-
tities, and other market outcomes, are dependent upon the initial dis-
tribution of resources, including intergenerational distributions.
"Since all of the variables that go into the calculation of net present
value of a project or policy proposal depend on the intergenerational
Is? See id. at 50.
1" Richard 11. Norgaard & Richard 13. Howarth, Sustainabilily and Discounting the Future,
in ECOLOGICAL. ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 88, 90
(Robert Costanza ed., 1991).
199 See id. at 88-101. In an especially lucid article on the issues posed by discounting,
Richard Revesz has proposed a similar demarcation between environmental regulation
benefits that accrue to current and future generations. See Revesz, supra note 190, at 947-
48. Like Norgaard and Howarth, he concludes that discounting is only justifiable in the
former case. For intergcnermional decisionmaking, Revesz proposes a "theory of
intergenerational obligations" that combines elements of sustainability, distributive justice,
corrective justice, and opportunity cost criteria. See id. at 1015-16.
200 Joseph Stiglitz, Growth with Exhaustible Natural Resources: The Competitive Economy, 41
REV. EcoN. STun, 139 (1974).
201 Id. at 139.
2°2 See supra text accompanying note 192.
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distribution of income, what might appear to be a good social invest-
ment under one income distribution may be marginal or worse under
another. "203 In other words, relying upon market rates of interest to
guide social policies affecting intergenerational resource distribution
presupposes the very judgment to be made.
Because he recognizes that discounting acts as a subtle proxy for
important decisions of intergenerational equity in this manner, 2"
famed economist Robert Solow has suggested that the discount rate
should be determined directly by society rather than by reference to
market interest rates. 205 Selection of a social discount rate, however,
must be determined in large part by society's view of the initial
intergenerational distribution of resources. Following selection of the
rate, a new equilibrium will emerge in which resources are distributed
differently among generations. That new equilibrium will cause the
current generation to reconsider its choice of the appropriate dis-
count rate, which will result in still another equilibrium, and so on.
Thus, relying upon use of a discount rate to automatically "cor-
rect" the problem of intergenerational distribution is problematic, no
matter how the rate is determined. Intergenerational distributive
questions are rate-determining, not rate-determined, In other words,
the decision whether to curtail greenhouse emissions should depend
directly on whether society wishes to risk depriving future generations
of climate stability, not on whether the discount rate will permit it to
happen. As Norgaard and Howarth put it, "Questions which are fun-
damentally matters of equity should be treated as such." 200
Returning to Farber and Hemmersbaugh's example helps to il-
lustrate these considerations. On the standard approach, if a pro-
posed regulation would save the lives of one billion people five hun-
dred years from now, the value of those lives is discounted to a present
value. In essence, economists attempt to measure what it is worth to
society now to save the lives of a billion people in the future. As Farber
and Hetmnersbaugh demonstrate, it turns out not to be worth very
much. However, the use of the present generation's valuation of the
203 Norgaard & Howarth, supra note 198, at 97-98.
2°1 Robert M. &plow, Tlw Economics of Resources Or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM.
REv. PAPERS & PROC. I, 10 (1974) Mite choice of a social discount rate is, in effect, a pol.
icy decision about	 intergenerational distribution.").
205 Id. Indeed, Solow argues that "tto generation 'should' be favored over any other,"
and that instead discounting should be viewed as simply a "concession to human weakness
...." Robert Solow, An Almost Practical Step Toward Sustainnhility, 19 RESOURCES MCI' 162,
165 (1993).
2°6 Norgaard & Howarth, supra note 198, at 98.
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worth of a future generation's lives is a normative judgment that
should not be obscured by arithmetic. As Lisa Heinzerling powerfully
put it, "Generating numbers that are ultimately irrelevant to the ques-
tions to be resolved does more than waste precious regulatory re-
sources. It changes the apparent nature of the decision itself, and
permits politics and ideology to hide behind a mask of technical ex-
pertise."207
7. Summary
The foregoing discussion provides an overview of fundamental
concepts and methodologies in ecological economics. Beginning with
the principle that the environment's capacity to regenerate resources
and absorb wastes is limited, ecological economists argue that the
scale of the human economy also must be subject to limits if it is to be
sustainable over time. At some point, possibly already reached, eco-
nomic expansion necessarily creates more environmental and social
costs than gains. A national policy that seeks indiscriminate growth in
the sheer volume of market transactions cannot be relied upon to
recognize and respond to this point. Instead, policymakers must de-
vise new economic tools for modeling the interrelationship between
economic and ecological spheres of activity. Data derived from such
tools can help inform the essentially moral decision of how best to
regulate economic life to ensure sustainability for succeeding genera-
tions.
IL CRITICISMS OF ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
The work of ecological economists has attracted considerable
criticism from mainstream economists and other academics. As will be
seen, these critiques frequently reflect misunderstandings about the
basic premises of the new discipline. Moreover, they often raise points
that are not in conflict with the writings of thinkers like Daly and in-
stead play an even more central role in ecological economics than
mainstream economics. Nevertheless, one particular critique—relat-
ing to the potential for market forces to cause resource conservation,
technological innovation, and other limit-avoiding substitutions to
arise as a matter of course from the market—represents a legitimate
bone of contention with ecological economists. The debate cannot be
resolved through theoretical analysis alone, but instead raises an em-
Ilcitmerling, Discounting Life, supra note 190, at 1915.
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pirical question that only will be answered by the unfolding of global
events over time. In other words, the debate at present hinges not on
economic logic, but on the faith one places in human knowledge and
the view one holds of the ultimate goals of human activity.
A. Sustainable Growth vs. Sustainable Development
In a well-known article, philosopher Mark Sagoff challenged
many of the teachings of ecological economics, including the view
that growth in the economy is necessarily correlated with increased
material throughput. 208 As he notes, there is a great deal of evidence
to suggest that increases in GNP may be achieved without correspond-
ing increases in resource consumption or waste production. For in-
stance, between 1973 and 1986 energy consumption in the United
States remained virtually flat while economic production expanded by
almost 40%. 209 Likewise, "[s] ince 1973, France and West Germany
have decreased per capita emissions from fossil fuels as their econo-
mies have expanded." 21° In the United Kingdom, demand for primary
energy sources was less in 1990 than in 1974, even though the coun-
try's national product had grown. 211 Faced with evidence such as this,
many commentators "[find] no reason to agree with the contention
of ecological economists . . . that growth in the sense of greater gross
domestic product is unsustainable because it necessarily strains natu-
ral limits and leads automatically to resource depletion and ecological
demise."212
Such criticisms unwittingly embrace the aspirations of ecological
economists. Daly has steadfastly argued in favor of a conceptual dis-
tinction between types of economic expansion, a line which current
national accounting measures such as GNP refuse to draw. 213
Specifically, Daly refers to an increase in the sheer physical scale of
the human economy, including especially the volume of resource de-
pletion and waste emission, as growth. 214 The creation of value without
a corresponding increase in the economy's physical burden on the
202 Mark Saga'', Carrying Capacity and Ecological Economics, 45 131oScIENcr. 610, 614
(1995).
209 MICHAEL BROWER, COOL ENERGY: RENEWABLE SOLUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS 13 (1992).
210 See Sagoff, supra note 208, at 614.
211 see id,
212 Id. at 614-15.
213 See DAIS, supra note 58, at 28.
214 see id,
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environment, such as through increases in productive efficiency, Daly
refers to as development.2 t5
Making these distinctions explicit serves an important purpose
for Daly: "We can ... distinguish growth (quantitative expansion)
from development (qualitative improvement), and urge ourselves to
develop as much as possible, while ceasing to grow, once the regen-
erative and absorptive capacities of the ecosystem are reached (sus-
tainable development)."216 In other words, commentators who cite
increases in productive efficiency as evidence of the possibility of eco-
nomic expansion without environmental devastation have merely de-
scribed the economy of sustainable development that Daly and other
ecological economists advocate.
B. The Solar Exception to the Laws of Thermodynamics
Sagoff also has questioned the view that energy sources are sub-
ject to the laws of thermodynamics. 2" By noting that "MI' we ignore
pollution problems, fossil fuels could subsidize the global economy
for quite a while 9"218 he purported to demonstrate that low-entropy
terrestrial sources of fuel were not as limited as ecological economists
portray. Of course, this argument appears to be challenging only the
exact location of resource limits, not their existence. Moreover, in ad-
dition to the direct limit on fossil fuel production, there is also the
indirect limit caused by the decreasing tolerance of the atmosphere to
thermal waste. Exclusion of such "pollution problems" from consid-
eration is a theoretical sleight of hand because pollution in the form
of greenhouse emissions arguably has become the relevant constraint
in fossil fuel consumption. "Indeed, falling [fossil fuel] extraction
costs, considered as evidence against scarcity in another context,
make the pollution problem worse [by increasing production]." 219
In recognition of these constraints, Sagoff turns to renewable
sources of energy, such as wind and solar power: "These sources—
which dwarf fossil fuels in the amount of energy they make
available—seem so abundant that for practical purposes they may be
215 See id.
215
 See id. at 28-29.
217 See Sagoff, supra note 208, at 612-13.
219 Id. at 612.
219 Herman E. Daly, Rept), to Mark Sagoffs "Carrying Capacity and Ecological Economies," 45
RioScIENCE 621,623 (1995).
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regarded as infinite."220 Again, Sagoff does not appear to have chal-
lenged the laws of thermodynamics. He has only argued that, in light
of the massive life expectancy of the sun, solar power may be consid-
ered so abundant that the laws of thermodynamics do not appear, to
humans, to be binding. But binding they remain.
In essence, what- Sagoff has - done is accept Georgescu-Roegen's
conclusion without accepting his logic. The very reason one should
advocate conversion to renewable energy sources is that the laws of
thermodynamics make their use arguably utility-maximizing for hu-
man development. Widespread adoption of renewable energy sources
greatly expands the expected length of human survival and therefore
helps to increase population-wide utility over time. Such potentially
welfare-enhancing choices are more likely to be made under an eco-
nomic world-view which accepts the laws of physics. Sagoff's assump-
tion—that "it is not obvious how the second law of thermodynamics
limits economic growth "221—re c og nizes no adverse consequences
from continued profligate consumption of fossil fuels, and therefore
lends no urgency to the need to switch to "infinite" solar sources of
energy. Georgescu-Roegen's assumption—that fixed amounts of "mat-
ter-energy enter[] the economic process in a state of low entropy and
[necessarily] come [] out of it in a state of high entropy"M—counsels
the course of conduct that will result in the least reduction of low-
entropy fuel sources in order to achieve a given level of output.
C. Unemployment
The primary means by which ecological economic proposals are
attacked in popular discourse is through juxtaposition of environ-
mental and economic ends as if the two cannot coexist. Of such at-
tacks, the most familiar seems to be the contention that limiting ex-
ploitation of resources would slow the economy and raise
unemployment. Such arguments can be very persuasive in a society,
where increasing numbers of people feel insecure in their present
employment2" and where real income has been stagnant or declining
for the last three decades. 224
220 Sagoff, supra note 208, at 612.
221 Id. at 613.
222 Georgesco-Roegen, supra note 57, at 77.
242 See Vicki Schultz., Life's ll'oth,100 coLum.	 1881, 1924 (2000).
224 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & STEWART J. SCHWAB, FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR AND EM-
PLOYMENT LAW 36 (2000).
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Nevertheless, these arguments should be viewed with caution.
The link between protecting the environment and raising unemploy-
ment is not unequivocal. Current fiscal policy taxes income, thereby
raising the cost of labor, while not taxing, and frequently even subsi-
dizing, energy production and resource extraction, thereby lowering
the cost of capital. The natural result of such a state is to depress de-
mand • for workers while raising demand for machines. Thus, "[On
Canada, the world's biggest timber exporter, the number of jobs per
volume harvested has fallen by 20 percent in the last 20 years, despite
a substantial rise in harvest levels."225 Shifting to a fiscal policy in
which depletion quotas or taxes equalize the playing field between
inputs would slow the drive toward automation and reduced use of
labor.
Indeed, many sustainable business practices are more labor-
intensive than their nonsustainable counterparts. Organic farming,
for instance, requires more workers per hectare than conventional
farming.226 Meanwhile, the evidence does not seem to suggest that
declines in per hectare (as opposed to per worker) productivity from
such sustainable practices are inevitable or even likely. In Indonesia,
for instance, fifty-seven of sixty-six pesticides used on rice have been
banned since 1986 in an effort to respond to the adaptation of the
brown planthopper to previous chemical spraying. 227 Pesticide subsi-
dies, which had previously been as high as 80%, were phased out and
funding was switched to integrated pest management, a technique
that seeks to use natural pest control methods as the primary means
of crop defense. 228
 "Since then, more than 250,000 farmers have been
trained in IPM techniques, insecticide use has plunged by 60 percent
and the rice harvest has risen more than 15 percent. Farmers and the
Indonesian treasury have saved ... more than $1 billion."229 These
possibilities are not restricted to Indonesia: experts estimate that pes-
ticide use in the United States could be reduced by 50% for only a
negligible (less than 1%) increase in food costs. 238
225 Abramowitz & Mattoon, supra note 79, at 76.
226 See Keith jauatgaard, Farm Labor and Managemma, in PLANNING THE FUTURE: DEVEL-
OPING AN AGRICULTURE THAT SUSTAINS LAND AND COMMUNITY 83, 86 (Elizabcth Ann R.
Bird et al. eds., 1995).
227 PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE 11. EHRLICH, BETRAYAL OF SCIENCE AND REASON 165
(1996).
228 See id. at 165.
rs. jrd,
270 See id. at 166.
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The belief that ecologically sustainable business practices neces-
sarily cause increased unemployment may simply result from a lack of
imagination. Recreational use of U.S. National Forests generates
nearly 2.6 million jobs and adds $97.8 billion to the national econ-
omy. Meanwhile, logging - contributes only seventy-six thousand jobs
and $3.5 billion."' Yet job creation is the constant refrain of policy-
makers who call for increasing harvest levels and industry subsidies. 232
Institution of sustainable economic policies may result in dynamic
shifts in job concentrations, rather than an absolute loss of employ-
ment. Indeed, the employment challenge facing ecological econo-
mists might well turn out to be less difficult than the one facing their
growth-oriented counterparts, which is, "[H]ow can full employment
be maintained in an economy that becomes ever more capital- and
energy-intensive in its technology while at the same time facing ever
greater scarcity of the nonrenewable resources upon which its tech-
nology is based?" 233
D. The Possibility of Substitutes
In response to the challenge of ecological economists, main-
stream economists often cite the possibility of substituting resources
whenever particular scarcities threaten to constrain growth. Solow ex-
presses this position well: "It is of the essence that production cannot
take place without some use of natural resources. But I shall also as-
sume that it is always possible to substitute greater inputs of labor, re-
producible capital [e.g., technology], and renewable resources for
smaller direct inputs of the fixed resource."234 Moreover, economists
often envision this substitution as arising automatically from market
forces. As resource depletion results in dwindling stocks, prices rise
and producers switch to one of the other available substitutes for
natural resources. In short, economists believe that "increasing re-
source scarcity ... always generate [s] price signals which . 	 engen-
der compensating economic and technological developments, such as
231 See Abramoviiz & Mattoon, supra note 79, at 76.
232 See id. at 75.
233 Herman E. Daly, Postscript: Some Common Misunderstandings and Further Issues Con-
cerning a Steady-Stale Economy, in VALUING TIM EAR-nt: ECONOMICS, EcoLocv, E'Docs 365,
375 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. "rownsend eds., 1993).
234 SOIOW, supra note 205, at 164.
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resource substitution, recycling, exploration, and increased efficiency
in resource utilization."236
This Section reviews a number of ways in which ecological
economists have responded to this line of argument.
1. Externalities
In order for the market to effectively recognize resource scarci-
ties and signal the need for substitution, prices must reflect all of the
environmental costs associated with the production and consumption
of a good. 236 For instance, without some form of carbon tax placed on
timber harvesting, worldwide lumber production could continue at a
steady pace for at least a few more decades, with the market never
recognizing a resource scarcity and therefore never warning actors to
substitute other inputs for lumber. At the same time, however, the
consequent climate impact from deforestation—which accounts for as
much as one-third of the carbon dioxide released into the atmos-
phere as a result of human activity237—could impose costs on society
of a tremendous magnitude. Ecological economists argue that exter-
nalities of this nature are a pervasive feature of market activity.
Moreover, they argue that the modern understanding of ecosystem
dynamics shows that externalities are far more complex and unpre-
dictable than the simple polluting factory and neighboring clothes-
line posited as the standard economic example of such external-
ities. 238
To enrich the textbook example, ecological economists describe
actual and current cases in which market mechanisms cannot be re-
lied upon to alert economic actors to scarcities of resources or im-
pairments of ecosystem services. The most obvious examples occur in
relation to what Daly calls the ecological "sink"—the land, water, and
air systems that absorb the thermal waste of the economic process.239
As Hardin so eloquently pointed out, the waste absorption capacity of
the environment is not subject to private ownership yet it is subject to
235 C01111 W. Clark, Economic Biases Against Sustainable Development, in ECOLOGICAL Eco-
NOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SustAtNAnit.rry 319, 320 (Robert Costanza
ed., 1991).
235 SeeDAL Y, supra note 58, at 54.
237 See Molly O'Meara, The Risks of Disrupting Climate, in WORLDWATCI1 READER ON
GLORAL ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs 27, 54 (Lester R. Brown & Ed Ayres eds., 1998).
2" See A. MITCUELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-13
(1980).
239 See DA', supra note 140, at 33.
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unrestrained private use. 24° Thus, the arsonists who cleared land in
Indonesia by burning two million hectares of forest during 1997 had
no economic reason to consider the health costs to the more than
twenty million people who breathed hazardous smoke-filled air, hun-
dreds of whom were killed and thousands of whom were sent to
medical treatment facilities. 241 Similarly, a small but un-priced contri-
bution to worldwide climate change is the direct and foreseeable con-
sequence of every individual's turn of the ignition key in his or her
car. Due to pervasive media' coverage, this causal relationship is likely
well-known, yet waste emissions continue to rise.
Other failures of the market to signal ecological scarcities result
from "accidental" tragedies. Ecosystem processes are intensely com-
plex and difficult to predict. Actions that are not motivated by the
self-interest of the commons problem can still inadvertently result in
ecological harm. For instance, farmers in industrialized nations have
relied heavily on chemical pesticides and fertilizers to boost yields
since the 1950s. Although the resulting "green revolution" fueled
productivity growth for decades, 242 unintended consequences of in-
dustrial farming have included an acceleration in the erosion of fer-
tile topsoi1,243 the rise of agricultural runoff to become a leading
source of health-endangering water pollution in the United States, 244
and the destruction of non-pest species such as pollinator insects that
are indispensable to the production of other crops. 245 These conse-
quences are likely not the result of deliberate, self-interested exter-
nalization by agribusiness. However, their occurrence is just as much a
tragedy of the commons as if they had been.
As an example of just how unexpected and dramatic the impact
of economic activity can be on delicate ecosystems, consider the case
of ballast water which is pumped;in and out of ships as they follow in-
ternational trading routes. "Ballast water exchange has become a
240 See Ilardip, supra note 43, at 1245. •
241 SeeAhraniovitz, supra note 136, at 150-51.
242 See Mona L. llymel, The Population Crisis: The Stork, the Plow, and the IRS, 77 N.C. L.
Ray. 13, 78-79 (1998). There are clear signs, however, that the revolution has ended:
"Global grain production per person has slipped downward since 1985." Id. at 79.
245 See id. at 80-81.
244 See id. at 82-83. Nitrogen from fertilizers can he toxic to humans, especially chil-
dren. See id. at 84. Likewise, "lt he EPA considers at least 62% of all pesticides to be car-
cinogenic or potentially carcinogenic." Id. at 85.
245 See Abramovitz, supra note 136, at 161. The severity of this situation should not be
.underestimated: "One-third of U.S. agricultural output is from insect-pollinated plants
...."
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manmade overlay to the globe's natural currents—a network of
artificial rivers running through the oceans."246 Among the myriad
small creatures that follow these artificial currents is the comb jelly
which has been discharged into the Black Sea by ballast water carried
from far off ecosystems. 247 The companies responsible for the trans-
port of the comb jelly almost certainly did not include in their cost
calculations the devastation of Black Sea fisheries that resulted from
massive proliferation of jellies. 248
Examples of costs that fall outside the purview of market mecha-
nisms—both unintentionally and as a result of the common resource
problem—abound. Still other examples result from the market's fail-
ure to recognize that natural capital can be depleted when harvested
faster than its rate of regeneration. Drawing clown natural stocks at a
rate faster than they regi-ow imposes an externality on future genera-
tions—it reduces the resource base available to provide a stream of
ecological goods and services in the future. For this reason, economist
H. Scott Gordon's classic article discussing the difficulties inherent in
any attempt to prevent short-sighted depletion of fishery stocks 249 has
become an issue of actual, rather than mere academic, concern. Sev-
enty percent of the earth's major fish species are either fully or over-
exploited, while keystone species such as sharks, tuna, swordfish, and
cod are at their lowest points in history. 25° Similarly, while one-third of
Asia's forest cover has been lost since 1960, the economic calculus
behind such massive logging efforts probably did not consider the lost
value to future generatiOns of such forest services as the provision of
habitat for diverse plant and animal species, the stabilization of soil
cover to slow erosion and prevent landslides, the purification and pro-
tection of watersheds, and the absorption of atmospheric carbon. 251
For at least three reasons, therefore, resource scarcity in the tra-
ditional economic sense of the term may not be sufficiently correlated
with environmental damage to ensure substitution as a panacea for
ecological crises. First,. the commons problem may cause self-
interested behavior that results in an overall reduction in social wel-
fare. Second, the complexity of ecological interactions can lead to un-
248 See Chris Bright; Bio-Thvasions, in WORLDWATCH READER ON GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL ISSUES 115, 123 (Lester R. Brown & Ed Ayres eds., 1998).
247 See id.
248 See id.
249 See Gordon, supra note 44.
22° See McGinn, supra note 13, at 83.
281 See Abrammitz, supra note 136, at 157.
2001]	 Macroeconomic Analysis of Law	 53
intended or unrecognized, and therefore uncalculated, consequences
from economic activity. Third, the failure to conceive of natural re-
sources as capital goods requiring conservative management can ex-
ternalize costs onto future generations by reducing the resource base
that will be available to theta. So long as these possibilities for exter-
nalizing costs exist, ecological economists believe there will be inade-
quate incentives to invest in developing technological improvements
or resource substitutes.
Of course, even with a failure to internalize costs, substitutes may
develop when a particular type of natural capital or ecosystem service
becomes so scarce that its commodification becomes profitable. But
there is no sense in which this type of substitution is optimal. The reduction
in availability of such capital and services will have occurred in the
absence of government policies that internalize the costs unposed on
present and future generations, making it simply unknown whether
the private decisions giving rise to the resource scarcity were welfare-
maximizing. For instance, some may take solace in the fact that oxy-
gen tanks have become a saleable commodity in heavily polluted cit-
ies. 252 They may view this as a sign that the market is working and that
even the seemingly unavoidable constraint of the atmosphere can be
circumvented by substitution, at least on a local level. They would be
wrong to assume, however, that this development has been welfare-
maximizing, given that it resulted from a series of private decisions
that did not take account of the full consequences of contemplated
actions.
2. Scale
The preceding discussion underscores a second way in which
ecological economists challenge the mainstream economist's faith in
the possibility of substitution. Traditionally, economists who recognize
external effects from economic activity propose the imposition of a
tax on the activity equal in amount to the externalized harm. They
argue that if society levies a duty in this manner, private economic de-
cisions will be forced to take account of the full social cost of a con-
templated activity. Resulting action will then represent a welfare-
252 See Harald Maass, Fresh Air in Beijing Comes in Mire; Unrontanrinated Breathing Proves
an &firing Novelly, S.F. EXAMINER, July 2, 1995, at Al 3 (describing how in Beijing, one of
the world's ten worst cities for air pollution according to the World Health Organization,
people have begun frequenting "oxygen bars" and purchasing "U.S.-manufactured ma-
chines that emit oxygen").
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maximizing choice in that it only will be undertaken if private benefits
exceed the full costs of the action. However, ecological economists
argue that this tendency to confront externalities through the use of
microcontrols such as environmental taxes cannot be relied upon to
resolve ultimate decisions regarding the scale of the macroeconomy.
Just as questions of intergenerational distributive equity cannot be
subsumed within the discount rate, 253 questions of scale cannot be
incorporated into the price mechanism.
Returning to the example of the polluted cities that have re-
sorted to selling oxygen, consider the difficulty of designing an opti-
mal tax that would have ensured that private decisions resulted in a
socially-desirable level of pollution. This exercise would have re-
quired, first, determining the precise atmospheric effect of all possi-
ble human influences on the pollution level and, second, assigning a
price to each such influence in proportion to its effect. The price
would have had to somehow quantify the value that the community
places on the quality of its air, taking into account both identifiable
costs such as health-related expenses and less tangible costs such as
the disutility of labored breathing. Obviously, such an exercise is
fraught with practical difficulty. Given the pervasiveness of environ-
mentally-destructive external effects from market transactions, the
difficulty of predicting or even recognizing such effects, and the near
impossibility of placing reliable dollar figures on them, ecological
economists believe that environmental taxes cannot attain the
comprehensiveness and accuracy needed to ensure ecological stability
by themselves. 2M
More importantly, even if optimal environmental taxes somehow
could be devised, the resulting path of development would represent
society's "chosen" path only in a very strained sense, given that it
would have resulted from a multitude of atomistic individuals making
atomistic decisions that purportedly included full consideration of the
environmental, social, and psychological consequences to the com-
munity from the contemplated action. Requiring individual consump-
tion choices to perform that much work in one's political economic
theory seems fanciful. Regardless of what tax is placed on a gallon of
gas, individuals cannot be expected to conceive of the decision to
start their vehicle as a "vote" on whether society should pollute its at-
mosphere or deprive future generations of climatic stability. As eco-
253 See supra text accompanying notes 190-207.
254 See DALY, Silpra note 58, at 54.
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logical economists argue, directly addressing such issues of scale
seems a much more efficient, and ultimately more reliable, means of
collective governance. Or, as Daly put it, "When increasingly vital
facts, including the very capacity of the earth to support life, have to
be treated as 'externalities,' then it is past time to change the basic
framework of our thinking so that we can treat these critical issues
internally and centrally."255
3. Technology
Still, many economists and public policy specialists continue to
contest the view that natural systems constrain the economy, believing
instead that an infinite fund of human intellectual capital can always
overcome problems of depletion and pollution. "The basic economic
resource—'the means of production,' to use the economist's term—is
no longer capital, nor natural resources . . . . It is and will be knowl-
edge."256 Essentially, these commentators argue that regardless of how
severely human activity taxes natural resources, human ingenuity is
the "ultimate resource."257 After all, technological innovations have
demonstrated an astounding ability to circumvent environmentally
imposed limits throughout modern history. Why should there be any
reason to suppose that advances in human knowledge and techno-
logical achievement cannot continue to drive economic growth, re-
gardless of nature's roadblocks? Solow once characterized this view as
follows: "If it is very easy to substitute other factors for natural re-
sources, then ... the world can, in effect, get along without natural
resources, so exhaustion is just an event, not a catastrophe."258
On one level, of course, this view is at odds with reality. As has
been explained by Georgescu-Roegen, absolute availability of natural
resources is limited such that substitutability, however perfectly exe-
cuted, cannot support limitless growth. 259 Economists who appeal to
substitutability seem to be arguing that although specific resources
may become scarce or even extinct, there can be no general scarcity
of resources. The laws of thermodynamics render this statement false.
255 Id. at 45.
256 PETER E DRUCKER, POST-CAMALIST SOCIETY 8 (1993).
257 See, e.g., julAAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1981); Julian L Simon, Re-
sources, Population, Environment: An Oversupply of False Bad News, 208 Scr. 1431 (1980).
255 Solow, supra note 204, at 11.
259 See Georgescu-koegen, supra note 67, at 92 ("One must have a very erroneous view
of the economic process as a whole not to see that there are no material factors other than
natural resources.").
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The fixed stock of matter-energy in the universe flows inevitably to-
ward a state of decreasing utility, in the economist's parlance.
Thermodynamic theory aside, however, it must be acknowledged
that the technological optimist's argument carries force. As an initial
matter, the astounding scientific achievements of the twentieth cen-
tury offer ample historical evidence against the gloomy predictions of
technological pessimists. Moreover, as. Sagoff's description of the
availability of solar entropy suggests, humanity may have a viable end
route around resource constraints, at least for as long as anyone at
this point could conceivably care. 260
 That is, if the world were to
switch entirely to renewable resources tomorrow, then there might be
no general scarcity of entropic flow for some five billion years, assum-
ing that no other ecological constraints become binding. hi a practi-
cal sense, therefore, one might say that resources are not limited sim-
ply because of the second law of thermodynamics. 261
All of this raises an important question: assuming that scientists
and technological innovators can be relied upon to circumvent natu-
rally imposed constraints on economic growth, why should any atten-
tion be paid to the scale of the economy at all? In other words, even if
Daly is right that increasing scale is a neglected problem in econom-
ics, why should it matter if scientific and technological capabilities
increase in conjunction with the economic scale?
One important answer to this question is that society may not ac-
tually prefer human-made substitutes to naturally provided goods and
services, irrespective of whether such technological substitutes are
feasible. The decision to require substitution therefore should be
made transparently rather than through millions of seemingly unre-
lated market transactions. Put differently, it may be a scientific (and
economic) achievement to continue supplying oxygen to humans
through tanks when the atmosphere itself becomes poisonous.
Whether that represents the first-best world is a separate question al-
together. In that regard, the many paeans to conservationist, commu-
nity-based, simplistic living that have captured popular imagination in
260 See supra text accompanying notes 217-222.
261
 This would be true only if the predicate conversion to renewable energy were sa-
tisfied. As noted above, widespread adoption of renewable energy is a measure that ap-
pears to follow inevitably from the ecological economist's worldview but only begrudgingly
(and perhaps too late) from the mainstream economises. See supra text accompanying
notes 217-222.
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recent decades262 might reflect a widespread and unmet desire for
precisely the type of control over scale that ecological economists ad-
vocate.
A second answer is that the economist's belief in technological
advancements depends on a debatable view that man-made capital
and natural capital are perfect substitutes. Daly argues that this concep-
tion is misguided: "Man-made capital and natural capital are funda-
mentally complements and only marginally substitutes." 263 One can
conceive of situations in which man-made capital or increases in pro-
ductive efficiency can substitute for a limited amount of a particular
natural resource in a given field. For example, when petroleum re-
sources needed to maintain asphalt roads become scarce, one can
substitute increased investment in car repair. 264 This marginal substi-
tutability, however, does not alter the fact that roads and cars are fun-
damentally, complements, just as all human labor and man-made capi-
tal are complements to natural resources. As Daly describes, "[O]ne
cannot build the same wooden house with half the timber no matter
how many saws and carpenters one tries to substitute." 265
This view seems correct. One can substitute for a scarce but nec-
essary resource at the margin—for instance, by using oxygen tanks in
a polluted city—but one cannot substitute for the resource in its en-
tirety. The debate between mainstream and ecological economists
would then appear to be over how large the margin of substitutability
really is; in other words, over how much faith to place in the power of
technology and human resourcefulness. Daly, the technological pes-
simist, views complementarity between input factors as the over-
whelming norm, while optimistic mainstream economists view the
marginal substitutability of man-made capital and natural resources as
covering a very wide margin. As! a matter of theoretical analysis, nei-
ther side of the debate holds a logically superior position. The re-
mainder of this Section reviews a few pieces of empirical evidence that
lend support to the ecological economists' view. Nevertheless, it must
762 See, e,g„ WENDELL BERRY, THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA: CULTURE & AGRICULTURE
(1977); DuANE ELGIN, VOLUNTARY SIMPLICITY: TOWARD A WAY OF LIFE THAT Is OUT-
WARDLY SIMPLE, INWARDLY RICH (1981); PAUL HAWKEN, THE ECOLOGY OF COMMERCE: A
DECLARATION OF SUSTAINABILITY (1993); FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS 'CO GROWTH
(1976); Axiom' B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATIIS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE (1977); JULIET
B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN (1991); E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL
(1973).
263 DAL Y, supra note 58, at 76.
261 See id. at 77.
265 Id. at 76.
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be acknowledged that the issue is a matter of present faith and only
future verification.
As noted, above, given the anticipated lifespan of the sun, en-
tropic solar flow may not cease for billions of years. 266 Many main-
stream economists find support for their views in this possibility: "Na-
ture need not limit economic growth ... as long as knowledge
increases and the sun shines."267 However, research by Peter Vitousek
and colleagues on the concept of global "net primary production"
suggests that even the "inexhaustible" resource of the sun imposes
current limits on the scale of human economic activity (as opposed to
temporal limits resulting front the sun's active lifespan). 268
Net primary production refers to the amount of solar energy cap-
tured by all life forms on the earth, less the energy used in their own
growth and reproduction. Unlike fossil fuels, which humans can con-
sume at a rate largely of their own choosing, the flow of solar energy
cannot be accelerated. The earth receives only a fixed annual supply
of solar radiation. Of this fixed supply, Vitousek and his colleagues
calculate that "approximately 40% of the present net primary produc-
tion in terrestrial ecosystems is being co-opted by human beings each
year."269 In other words,' almost half of the solar energy that reaches
land areas is currently being used to serve human needs. Inasmuch as
economic growth depends on further human appropriation of poten-
tial terrestrial productivity, there would appear to be a definite limit to
economic expansion: "If we take this percentage [of 40%] as an index
of the human carrying capacity of the earth and assume that a grow-
ing economy could come to appropriate 80% of photosynthetic pro-
duction before destroying the functional integrity of the ecosphere,
the earth will effectively go from half to completely full during the
next ... 35 years."27°
This limit might be better understood through a simple, well-
known thought experiment. Imagine a pond containing a weed that
266 See supra text accompanying note 261.
267 Sawa supra note 208, at 614.
268 Peter Vitonsek et al., human Appropriation of the Products of Photosynthesis, 36 1310-
SCIENCE 368 (1986).
269 id. at 372. The figure is 25% for total global net primary production, including
photosynthesis which occurs in the ocean. The higher terrestrial percentage is considered
the relative constraint, given humanity's primarily land-based existence.
270 W. E. Rees & M. Wackernagel, Ecological Footprints and Appropriated Carrying Capacity:
Measuring the Natural Capital Requirement of the Human Economy, in INVESTING IN NATURAL
CAPITAL: THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH '1'0 SIUSTAINABIL1TY 362, 383 (A. jansson et al. eds.,
1994).
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doubles in surface coverage every day and will cover the entire pond
in thirty days. 271 On the twenty-ninth day, the pond will be just half
full, a relatively mild state of affairs that hardly seems to portend that
in just one day the pond will be completely smothered, If Vitousek's
calculation of human appropriation of terrestrial photosynthetic
product is correct, humans currently fill about half of the global
pond.
Another useful thought experiment to demonstrate the comple-
mentarity of man-made and natural resources conies from Harrison
Brown.272 Suppose that all of the physical capital stock of the world
were annihilated overnight, but everything else (labor, knowledge,
natural resources, and so on) remained unchanged. Could society
conceivably replace the lost physical capital over any time span? Re-
cent analysis of data on world oil resources suggests that roughly one
trillion barrels of oil remain to be extracted. 273 Because approximately
eight hundred billion barrels have been consumed to date, 274 a little
over half of the original exploitable base of oil remains. Thus, taking
oil as a resource benchmark, one might presume that existing man-
made capital could be replaced by exploiting global oil and other
natural resource reserves (barring pollution problems, of course).
This presumption, however, fails to account for the fact that the exist-
ing physical infrastructure was constructed with the most easily avail-
able natural resources. "The reconstruction could not start again with
East Texas oil, but would have to start with offshore Alaskan oil to be
exploited without the further natural subsidy of Mesabi range iron
ore."275 Under such conditions, the possibility of reconstructing mod-
ern society seems much less certain—availability of natural resources
would pose a real and unavoidable limit on economic activity.
Finally, consider data offered by Lester Brown of the Worldwatch
Institute regarding the capacity of global agricultural production to
meet expected increases in population over the next half century. 276
While technological advances in irrigation, crop breeding, and
271 See Paul R. Ehrlich & Anne H. Ehrlich, Why Isn't Everyone as Scared as We Are?, in
VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, Elutes 55, 57 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth
N. Townsend eds., 1993).
272 Harrison Brown, Human !Materials Produrtion as a Process in the Biosphere, Sci. Mi.,
Sept.. 1970, at 195.
275 Flavin & Dunn, supra note 102, at 22, 24.
27a
	 id.
275 DALY, 5//Pla note 58, at 107.
276
 See ]..ester R. Brown, Feeding Nine Billion, in STATE or THE WORLD 115 (Lester R.
Brown et al. eds., 1999).
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chemical use acted as marginal substitutes for the natural scarcity of
cropland for several decades, since 1990 a different picture has
emerged: "Between 1950 and 1990, the [agricultural] yield per hec-
tare climbed by 2.1 percent a year, but during the 1990s it has in-
creased by only 1.1 percent a year." 277
 Because increased amounts of
fertilizers have little or no effect on yields past a certain point, fertil-
izer use has not increased in the United States since 1980. 278
 Modern
wheat varieties, which are bred to convert more than 50% of the
plant's photosynthetic product into seed, have little room left to in-
crease yields before they reach the scientifically estimated absolute
limit of 62%.279 Anything beyond that amount deprives the rest of the
plant of energy needed to sustain leaves, stems, and roots. 28°
Growth in irrigated agriculture has also contributed to productiv-
ity gains in the past, but appears to have plateaued amidst increasing
water scarcity. "Water tables are falling on every continent—in the
southern Great Plains of the United States, the southwestern United
States, much of North Africa and the Middle East, most of India, and
almost everywhere in China that the land is flat." 281 These areas of
water depletion coincide with major agricultural areas for a reason:
70% of all water diverted worldwide is used for agricultural irriga-
6°11.282
 Finally, there is the shrinking availability of cropland itself. Be-
tween 1950 and 1998, the grain harvested area per person dropped
from 0.23 hectares to 0.12 hectares per person. 283
Many see an uneasy future in these trends. The principal grain
exporting countries of the world, which together account for 85% of
worldwide exports, have stayed at or near two hundred million tons of
available grain exports since 1980. 284
 This is after climbing from sixty
million tons in 1950. 285
 The world currently contains around six bil-
lion people, an increase' of 4.4 billion in the last century alone.288 If,
as the United Nations expects, the total world population increases by
"7 See id. at 128.
278 See id. at 127.
279 See id. at 126-27.
29° See id.
"I See Brown, supra note 276, at 124.
282 See id. at 125.
283 See id. at 121.
28'1 See id. at 131.
285
 See id.
286 See Lester R. Brown & Christopher Flavin, A New Economy for a New Century, in STATE
OF TDE WORLD 3,8 (Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1999).
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over three billion during the next half century, 287 what man-made
capital will substitute for global grain shortages? What technological
innovation will boost yields when aquifers are depleted, topsoil
eroded, and arable land paved over?
As argued above, the answers to these questions currently de-
pend on faith, not economic logic. Thus, the decision whether to fa-
vor mainstream or ecological economic conceptions of the macroe-
conomy must depend on second-order principles about how to
behave, individually and socially, in the face of uncertainty. The next
subsection addresses the primary such principle advanced in favor of
ecological economics.
4. The Precautionary Principle
Ecological economists believe that mounting evidence of envi-
ronmental strain counsels conservativeness in the approach to ques-
tions of environmental import. The evidence suggests that ecosystem
activity does not follow predictable paths of linear causation, nor does
it necessarily sacrifice noncritical attributes first. 288 For reasons such as
this, ecological economists advocate use of the "precautionary princi-
ple,"289 a decision-theoretic principle that may be understood as a
formal expression of the age-old adage, "Better safe than sorry." Sup-
porters of the precautionary principle argue "that if it is known that
an action may cause profound and irreversible environmental damage
which permanently reduces the welfare of future generations, but the
probability of such damage is not known, then it is inequitable to act
as if the probability is knowil."29° Instead, society should establish "safe
minimum standards ... for protecting Earth's life-support systems in
the face of virtually inevitable unpleasant surprises." 291
As Daly has argued, precautionary policy measures might ironi-
cally serve to affirm the mainstream economist's belief in the power
of technology:
"7 See UNITED NATIONS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: TIIE 2000 REVISION 6 (2001)
(reporting projections of between 7.9 billion and 10.9 billion for world population in
2050, with a medium variant of 9.3 billion).
288 See supra text accompanying notes 236-252.
289 See Perrings, supra note 193, at 153.
2• Id. at 165-66.
491 Paul R. Eltrlich, Ecological Economics and the Carrying Capacity of the Earth, in iNvEsT-
ING IN NATURAL. CAPITAL: TIM ECOLOGICAL. APPROACII TO SUSTAINADILITY 38, 49 (A. Jans-
son at al. eds., 1994).
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If one is a technological optimist and believes that resources
are unimportant for the economic process, then one should
not object to a policy of limiting the resource throughput,
thereby raising its price. Such a policy would induce exactly
the technological advances that use resources more
efficiently—the very technology in which the optimists have
so much faith. If a side effect of reduced resource through-
put is to gain some insurance under the precautionary prin-
ciple, as well as to preserve more of the earth as habitat for
other species, then why object? Does the ... technological
optimist have the courage of his convictions? ... If technol-
ogy is the answer, why not actively promote its advance? 292
For these reasons—because the approach would yield significant
current benefits and because the alternative may risk irreversible and
catastrophic harm—ecological economists adopt the precautionary
approach as a guiding principle in the face of uncertainty over the
effects of human economic activity and the ability of human technol-
ogy to correct for those effects. 293
5. Summary
In a terse summary of the preceding debate, noted growth advo-
cate Julian Simon complains, "Daly builds everything on a single
premise, which is, resources are finite . ..." 294 Daly might properly
respond, mainstream macroeconomnists build everything on the oppo-
site premise, which is, resources are infinite. Given that the, latter
premise is contrary to logic, experience, and the consensus of the
global scientific community,295 it may not be radical to view ecological
economists as standing on a more solid footing than mainstream
economists. Ultimately, their differences come down to an empirical
question that will be answered only with the passing of time. In the
292
 Daly, supra note 219, at 624.
2" Although a fuller treatment is beyond the scope of this Article, it must be -acknowl-
edged that the precautionary principle is, in many respects under-theorized and much in
need of hit- tiler analysis and research. The most obvious criticism of the principle, for in-
stance, highlights the fact that the opportunity cost of "precaution" may iii fact be more
liarttd'td than the cost sought to be avoided. See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Pre-
cautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996); see also JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONA-
TI1AN BAERT WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK (1995).
294 jay Hancock, Growth Can Be Bad, UM Economist Says, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31, 1996, at 1C
(quoting Julian Simon, professor of business at the University of Maryland).
295 See infra text accompanying note 322.
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face of such uncertainty, many legal scholars might prefer to side with
the conservative approach adopted by ecological economists. Many
also might side with ecological economists for the altogether separate
reason that they favor greater control over the scale of the human
economy, regardless of whether technological advances can or cannot
avert environmental disaster.
III. LAW AND ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
Although few hi number, there have been significant efforts to
incorporate macroeconomic concepts into legal economic analysis. 296
Moreover, certain specific subject areas have benefited greatly from
scholarly application of macroeconomic insights, including interna-
tional trade regulation,297 foreign and domestic monetary policy, 298 as
well as immigration, 29° administrative,3°0 employment,301 taxadoi i,3°2
296 Seeps' Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law in
a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1315,1347-61 (1995); Wiesen, supra note 18; Kehnan, supra
note 19, at 1227-76; Lewin, supra note 18.
297 See Robert M. Stern, Conflict and Cooperation in International Economic Policy and Law,
17 U. PA. J. INT ' L ECON. L. 539 (1996).
298 See 'luny Caporale & Kevin 13. Grier, A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Applica-
tion to the Real Fed Funds Rate, 41 J.L. & FeON. 409 (1998); W. Mark Crain & Lisa K. Oakley,
The Politics of Infrastructure, 38J.1.. & ECON. 1 (1995); Daniel R. Fische] et al., The Regulation
of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301 (1987); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Inter-
est-Croup Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J. LEcm. Silvio. 433 (1998); Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Role of a Central Bank in a Bubble Economy, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 1053 (1996);
Dominick Salvatore, The International Monetary System: Past, Present, and Future, 62 FORD! IAM
L. REV. 1975 (1994); Kate Stith, Reuniting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1988); Rajesli Swan Mitt! I tan , Regulating Development: Structural
Adjustment and the Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 Cot.um. J.
TRANSNAT . I. L. 161 (1998).
299 See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized immigration as Free 7'rade: Economic VVelfare and the
Optimal Immigration Polity, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1997).
300 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautilid: The Case Against Special Regulatory
Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537 (1998).
See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegehnan, Law Co' Macroeconomics: Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation Over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709 (1993); Daniell Gillbrd,
Labor Polity in Late Tioentieth Century Capitalism: New Paradoxes for the Democratic State, 26
HoEsTttA L. REv. 85 (1997); Kellum], supra note 19; Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency,
51 STAN. L. REv. 73 (1998); Gary Militia, Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging ]Porkers: the 1990s
Version of Age and Pension Discrimination in Employment, 48 HASTINGS U. 511 (1997); An-
drew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire  Wrongful Discharge Law,
74 TEL L. REv. 1901 (1996); Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax
Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CIII: L. REv. 405 (1997); Peter Siegelman & John J.
Donohue Ill, The Selection of Employment Discrimination. Disputes for Litigation: Using Business
Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STuo. 427 (1995).
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environmental,"3
 and criminal law.s04 Despite these efforts, however,
the law and economics movement remains primarily restricted to the
application of microeconomic concepts to legal theory. This tradi-
tional exclusion of macroeconomic subject matter from law and eco-
nomics raises an obvious question: Do we really need a macroeconom-
ics for legal analysis?
The answer to this question requires a clear exposition of the
subjects with which economics is concerned. As Daly has pointed out,
there are three general dimensions to the economic problem: optimal
allocation of inputs among uses, equitable distribution of wealth, and
maintenance of economic scale within sustainable limits. 505 The first
dimension is the domain of microeconomics, while the latter two be-
long to macroeconomics. In both economic and legal economic
analyses, attention has focused almost exclusively on the first of these
dimensions. Traditionally, economists have argued that the best way to
solve the distribution problem is to provide an effective answer to the
allocation problem.306 By ensuring that resources are allocated to
their most efficient uses, one maximizes the amount of wealth cre-
ated, and hence, the amount of wealth available for distribution
throughout society."7 Increases in economic productivity, therefore,
can result, at least theoretically, in higher absolute levels of income
for everyone and the possibility of significant upward mobility for
some. In addition to providing an explicit laissez-faire response to the
question of distribution, this growth-oriented policy also provides an
implicit laissez-faire answer to the scale problem: by relying on eco-
nomic growth as a response to the problem of inequitable distribu-
3°2 See Edward J. McCaffery, 'Dix Polity under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEx. L.
REV. 1145 (1992); Sliaviro, supra note 301; Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progres-
sivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919 (1997).
3°3 See Vandana Date, Global "Development" and Its Environmental Ramifications—The Inter-
linking of Ecologically Sustainable Development and Intellectual Property Rights, 27 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 631 0997); Michael Wenig, rl fakingSenseof Growth and Sustainable Development:
Several Responses to Herman Daly's Latest Book, 28 ENV • L. L. 235 (1998).
304 See Phillip J. Cook & Gary A. Zarkitt, Crime and the Business Cycle, 14 J. LEGAL S•uo.
115 (1985); Llad Phillips et al., Crime, Muth, and the Labor Market, 80 J. POL. ECON. 491
(1972).
305 See DALY, supra note 58, at 50-51.
306
 See id. at 51.
3°7
 See Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, Do Rising Tides Lilt All Boats? The Impact of
Secular and Cyclical Changes on Poverty, 76 Am. EGON, REV. PAPERS & PROC. 405 (1986) (de-
scribing popular arg lllll ent tIlitt links poverty reduction to undiHerentktted CCOI101111C ex-
pansion).
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Lion, economists necessarily believe that the optimal scale of the
economy is always "bigger."
Law and economics scholars have adopted a similar, albeit far
more refined, position. Most law and economics thinkers accept Ste-
ven Shavell and Louis Kaplow's forceful argument that legal rules
should be constructed to achieve optimal allocation of resources
among competing uses, without concern for the distributional effects
of such rules. As they argue, for every inefficient but desirably redis-
tributive legal rule, one can imagine an alternate legal rule coupled
with a redistributive tax scheme that would achieve the same desired
wealth transfer without the efficiency loss. For that reason (along with
its comparative administrative advantage at transferring wealth), the
tax and transfer system should be the exclusive means for the gov-
ernment to address distributional concerns. 308 Of course, because re-
distribution of income through the tax and transfer system is simply a
matter of setting politically-determined levels of redistribution, its in-
terest to legal economists has been somewhat negligible. Despite a
recent provocative attempt to reconsider Shavell and Kaplow's argu-
ment on empirical and theoretical grounds,"9 its hold over the disci-
pline remains. Consequently, the question of equitable distribution,
and with it the field of macroeconomics, has been largely removed
from the domain of law and economics.
Thus, both economists anti legal economists have found theo-
retical grounds for ignoring the problem of wealth distribution and
the lesser-recognized problem of sustainable scale. Meanwhile, wealth
disparities have risen to record levels,30 a fact that might reflect con-
temporary America's lack of political resolve to use the tax and trans-
fer system in the manner hypothesized by Shavell and Kaplow. This
we See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shawl!, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HAIM L. REV. 961
(2001); Louis Kaplow Sc Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role
of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL Sim). 821 (2000);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Illy the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 231. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) [hereinafter, Kaplow & Shavell, Ilk the
Legal System]; Steven Shaven, A Note on Et irienry vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulernaking:
Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am. EcoN. ASSN PA-
PERS & PROC.. 414 (1981).
30° See Christine jolts, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Wm.
L. RE.v. 1653 (1998).
350 In 1996, the U.S. Bureau of the Census reported that there has been an escalating
increase in income inequality since 1968: "III he ratio of the average income of the top 20
percent of households to the bottom 20 percent went from 10.2 in 1968 to 12.5 in 1992
and 13.6 in 1994." Daniel H. Weinberg, A Brief Look at Postwar U.S. Incosne Inequ alit},
U.S, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P60-191, at 2 (1996).
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failure cannot be considered a direct or intended consequence of
Shave11 and Kaplow's reasoning, of course. Their argument contem-
plates removing distributional issues from analysis of legal rules; it
does not advise ignoring such issues in all aspects of political discus-
sion.
Yet the effect of their analysis might be to do just that—economics,
and in particular growth economics, has become the dominant lan-
guage of political speech, to the point of largely drowning out other
dialects. As one scholar put it, "the increasing domination of homo
economicus is evidenced by the fact that public discourse has become
hostage to economics and has begun to dance to, instead of call, the
economic tune: it is thoroughly infiltrated by the economic mindset
and attuned to its interests."311 Before such economics occupied the
bulk of the political landscape, it may have been appropriate to ig-
nore distributional concerns on the assumption that they would be
dealt with by the moral and political will of the people. Now it has be-
come arguably tantamount to assigning a zero value to the goal of eq-
uitable distribution. In other words, when economists and legal
economists exclude certain issues from their discussion on the as-
sumption that some other discipline or some other mechanism will ad-
dress the excluded Concern, they may in effect be relegating that con-
cern to the dustbin of politics.
In the terms of Shaven and Kaplow's argument, while it may be
true that "any regime with an inefficient [but redistributive] legal rule
[can be replaced with an] efficient legal rule and a modified income
tax system in which all individuals are better off,"512 the modified in-
come tax system necessary to ensure that such a Pareto improvement
actually eventuates may not be possible within a given political cli-
mate, including perhaps the current one. As a practical matter, there-
fore, Shave11 and Kaplow's argument may demonstrate only that poten-
tial Pareto improvements may be gained by excluding distributive
effects from the selection of legal rules. Whether legal decisionmakers
should continue to ignore distributional effects when it is confidently
known that the necessary "modified income tax system" will not be
adopted—that is, when it is known that the redistribution necessary to
achieve the Pareto improvement will not occur—is a question not di-
511
 Allan C. Hutchinson, Life After Shopping: From Consumers to Citizens, in CONSUMER
LAW IN TILE GLOBAL ECONOMY 25 (lain Ramsay ed., 1997).
312 Kaplow & Shawl!, Why the Legal System, supra note 308, at 669.
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reedy addressed by Shavell and Kaplow's argument, as they themselves
acknowledge. 513
Precisely the same analysis applies to the goal of sustainable scale.
Although it has not appeared within the legal economic literature,
one could make an argument against the consideration of scale ef-
fects  of legal rules that tracks Shavell and Kaplow's reasoning. The
same response, however, would apply: whether ignorance of scale ef-
fects is justified in the face of legislative recalcitrance is a separate,
and more difficult, question. Indeed, with respect to scale, the prob-
lem is worse because no mechanism analogous to the tax and transfer
system exists to regulate the scale of the economy, even if economic
discourse does not crowd the issue out of political attention. The
problem of achieving a sustainable scale of the human economy is left
as a macroeconomic goal better addressed through unique, macro-
economic policy instruments—yet no such instruments are in place.
And to compound the problem, the current accepted wisdom regard-
ing the distribution problem—that growth in the scale of the econ-
omy will raise absolute wealth levels for all market participants—di-
rectly conflicts with the goal of maintaining society's ecological
footprint within sustainable parameters.
In short, current economic wisdom attempts to "solve" two of so-
ciety's most urgent problems by trading them off against each other,
and current legal economic wisdom appears to have found reasons
for ignoring both. The inconsistency is not recognized because main-
stream macroeconomics does not acknowledge the problem of regu-
lating scale. Perpetual growth is considered a viable response to the
distribution problem because no adverse consequences to such
growth are recognized. In effect, economists believe that they have
found the global free lunch. Critics of this economic policy are at a
decided disadvantage in popular and scholarly debates because they
cannot point to any harmful effects of growth. Instead, they can only
argue that economic growth has not achieved the goal of reducing
wealth inequality. But that failure is not enough to overcome the
compelling force of Pareto improvement: if a few people are better
off because of economic groWth, and no one is worse off, how can
growth be opposed?
313 See id. at 675 ("An argument sometimes offered in favor of redistribution through
legal rules is that the tax system falls short of optimal redistributive taxation—perhaps
because of the balance of political power in the legislature. This argument raises questions
that we do not seek to address about the function of courts in a democracy.").
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Ecological economists reveal the fallacy of this position by mak-
ing the problem of sustainable scale an issue of explicit concern.
Through the lens of ecological economics, growth economics be-
comes assailable not only because wealth increases might not "trickle
down" in the predicted fashion, but also because the biophysical de-
mands entailed by economic growth may have pushed the human
economy toward unsustainable levels. Once one accepts the founda-
tional principle of ecological economics—that the level of material
throughput in the economy is subject to ecological constraints—the
macroeconomic concerns of distribution and scale can no longer he
pushed to the side in the ever-intensifying pursuit of allocative
efficiency. Indeed, as noted above, there is some reason to believe that
economic growth in America in the latter decades of the twentieth
century has become harmful to society on net, once one considers the
environmental and social externalities that are not ordinarily ac-
counted for by macroeconomic indicators. 314 Under such conditions,
scale and distribution can no longer remain the neglected stepsiblings
of allocation within the family of economic aspirations.
For at least two reasons, then, law and economics may be incom-
plete without some form of macroeconomics to inform its analysis.
First, because no political mechanism analogous to the tax and trans-
fer system exists to regulate the scale of the macroeconomy, legal
economic scholars cannot safely ignore the scale effects of alternative
legal rules in the way that they have ignored distributive effects. Sec-
ond, because the traditional response of economists to the distribu-
tion problem is in direct conflict with the goal of sustainable scale, law
and economics' continued ignorance of both problems may result in
the discipline's long-term marginalization. In other words, if natural
limits turn out to constrain the scale of the human economy in the
manner hypothesized by ecological economists, then the economist's
practice of postponing the problem of distribution by punting on the
problem of scale will not be viable in the long run. In light of this pos-
sibility, legal economic scholars may be wise to address both problems
now by allowing ecological economic insights to inform their analysis.
This methodological approach would have two obvious but im-
portant effects. First, it would force legal scholars to confront the
problem of maintaining a sustainable economy in their relevant
analyses. By incorporating ecological economic insights into legal pol-
icy discussion, legal scholars could essentially leapfrog mainstream
314 See supra text accompanying notes 143-172.
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economic thought to provide both the theoretical impetus for and
the practical construction of policy tools that ensure long-term
sustainability. The practical benefit of confronting the problem of
scale is potentially enormous. Recently, 1586 scientists from 63 coun-
tries, including 104 of the 178 living Nobel Prize winners in the sci-
ences, signed the World Scientists' Call for Action at the Kyoto Cli-
mate Summit which stated that "the scientific community ha[s]
reached a consensus that grave threats imperil the future of humanity
and the global environment." 16.. The United States' failure to heed
this call to action from many of the world's most learned scientific
experts demonstrates the stranglehold that mainstream economic
ideology has on the political mindscape." 6 By incorporating ecologi-
cal economic insights into their policy analysis, however, legal eco-
nomic scholars could take an important step toward harmonizing
economic and scientific concerns.
A secondary effect of such an effort likely would be to revitalize
the debate over distributional equity. If it is accepted that
sustainability requires limits to the physical strain placed by humans
on the ecosphere, absolute growth in the scale of the human econ-
omy would no longer be available as an answer to the problem of in-
equitable distribution.nstead, society would have to address the
Necessaryproblem directly as a  subissue to the problem of determin-
ing a permissible level of resource throughput that does not jeopard-
ize the viability of future generations. Of course, Shavell and Kaplow's
argument that distributional concerns are more efficiently addressed
through the tax and transfer system than through legal rulemakings 17
would still apply under such a worldview. However, legal scholars and
legal decisionmakers would have renewed interest in making certain
that the goal of equitable distribution is actually being served, or at
least examined, by other political mechanisms. The difficult question
of political philosophy not addressed by Shavell and Kaplow's argu-
ment.918 might then become an issue of some urgency.
Either the primary or the secondary effect seems sufficient to
justify the use of ecological economics in legal analysis, at least in the
tentative manner practiced by this Article. If further justification is
needed, one may consider the reputational benefits that would accrue
313 Union of Concerned Scientists, World Scientists' Call for Action, available at Imp://
www.tacsnsa.org/about/callforaction.lnnl (last visited October 25, 2001).
316 See ,sufira note 14.
317 See supra text accompanying note 308.
318 See supra note 313.
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to law and economics from beating its parent discipline to a cosmo-
logical perspective that is arguably both inevitable and potentially pre-
servative of the human species, if only it is achieved with requisite
haste.
CONCLUSION
At the time Adam Smith developed the image of rational market
behavior, science in general was captivated by Enlightenment notions
of limitless human intellectual ability" 9 That microeconotnists have
clung to these notions longer than practitioners of any other disci-
pline reflects what Alfred North Whitehead called the fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness—a failure to recognize that one's abstract theo-
ries continually must be informed by the reality from which they were
abstracted. 3" Indeed, it has only been in recent years that scholars of
behavioral law and economics have made progress in upsetting the
presumption of rationality in legal economic analysis by incorporating
the decidedly nonrational findings of cognitive psychologists. 3"
A similar historical analysis applies to macroeconomics. When the
core concepts of macroeconomics developed, the world contained four billion less
people than it does today. The preanalytic vision which informed the de-
velopment of neoclassical thought was that of a world in which human
activity was but a tiny fraction of global activity. Human use of re-
sources and production of wastes was considered costless because the
regenerative and absorptive capacities of the earth appeared to have
no limits. Today, evidence to the contrary arrives with regularity, to
the point that the Royal Society of London and the United States Na-
tional Academy of Sciences issued an unprecedented joint action
statement, warning: The future of our planet is in the balance. Sus-
tainable development can be achieved, but only if irreversible degra-
dation of the environment can be halted in time. The next 30 years
319 Sec LESTER THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS 216 (1983) ("One of the peculiarities
of economics is that it still rests on a behavioral assumption—rational utility maxintiza-
don—that has long since beets rejected by sociologists and psychologists who specialize in
sunlying human behavior: Rational individual utility (income) maximization was the
common assumption of all social science in the nineteenth century, hut only economics
con es to use it.").
32° WIMehead defined the fallacy as "neglecting the degree of abstraction involved
when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of
thought." ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY, AN ESSAY IN COSMOLOGY 8
(David Ray Griffin & Donald W. Sherburne eds., 1978).
521 See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
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may be crucial." 322 The continued dominance within economics of a
view of nature as limitless demonstrates that macroeconomic theorists
also may have committed Whitehead's anti-rationalist fallacy: "an arbi-
trary halt at a particular set of abstractions."323
Yet surprisingly little recognition has been given to the fact that
macroeconomics rests on what is arguably now a discredited world-
view. Among economists, increasing divergence between theory and
reality is accounted for by increasing recognition of "externalities,"
much like the Ptolemaic astronomers who attempted to save their
model of circular planetary motion through desperate addition of
epicycles. 324 However, lest society is to risk growing beyond the bio-
physical limits of the earth (not to mention the point at which mar-
ginal costs of macroeconomic growth exceed marginal benefits), it
seems appropriate to develop an alternative economics, one
grounded in scientifically plausible visions of the relationship between
economic and ecological spheres. What seems needed is a body of
market principles built on the assumptions that natural resources are
limited, that ecosystem services have value, and that the size of the
human economy is a legitimate subject for social control. Because
ecological economists have provided just that, their teachings may he
of great use to legal scholars in the years to come.
322 ROYAL SOCIETY Or LONDON & UNITED STATES NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
POPULATION GROWEII, RESOURCE CONSUMPTION, AND A SUSTAIN/11;1LE WORLD (1992).
523 WIIITF.IIEAD, supra Hole I, at 289.
324 See DALY 8c COBB, SItpra 110IC 132, at 53.
